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1. BARGAINING POWER 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Contractual relationships are created every day, but often one party to the contract is in a 
more powerful position than the other. In some instances an inevitable result is the abuse of 
that power. South Africa is a country plagued with poverty and illiteracy; therefore it is not 
hard to believe that people are often left with no choice but to enter into a contract weighted 
unfavorably against them. It is apparent that society is racked with abuse of unequal 
bargaining power between contracting parties. Under our law of contract, the application of 
unequal bargaining power, as a factor in challenging the validity of a contract, has been 
inconsistent as the weight afforded to unequal bargaining power when challenging the 
validity of a contract is uncertain. The purpose of this dissertation is to provide an evaluation 
of the current position on the role of unequal bargaining power and to speculate regarding its 
potential role in the future, by critically analyzing both the limited role and, more recently, 
the development of what appears to be a self-standing role afforded unequal bargaining 
power in South African contract law.  
 
1.2 The Definition of Bargaining Power 
 
Upon an examination of the various ways in which English law deals with unfair contracts, 
Beale concluded that the inequality of bargaining power is different in each case. This means 
that whether or not a contract is unfair due to inequality of bargaining power will not be able 
to be determined using an objective tool such as a definition of bargaining power. In other 
words, the unfairness of a contract can only be determined from an analysis of each party’s 
bargaining power separately, on the facts of each case.1 The reason each party’s bargaining 
power must be assessed separately is because a party’s bargaining power is not necessarily 
dependent on the other party’s bargaining power. In other words one party’s weakness may 
not always be the other party’s strength. To illustrate this point Sharrock provides the 
following example2: 
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A is in a strong bargaining position relative to B because A is under no pressure to make the 
contract in question with B and is able to offer B pre–formulated (standard) terms and tell him 
to “take it or leave it”. B may not need to make the contract with A and may be quite content to 
“leave it” and go elsewhere or do without. It is only if B needs to make the contract and does 
not have the option of going elsewhere (because there is not a reasonably competitive range of 
alternative parties available with whom he or she may make the contract) that A’s bargaining 
position is superior to B’s and, accordingly, there is bargaining inequality. 
The fact that bargaining power is not yet defined in our law must not prevent academics from 
studying the conditions under which the courts or legislation does offer relief.3 Beale explains 
that inequality of bargaining power ‘can mean ignorance, vulnerability to persuasion, 
desperate need, lack of bargaining skill or simple lack of influence in the market place’4 
while Barnhizer describes bargaining power as the ‘power to obtain a preferred outcome in a 
transaction’.5 
Beale also commented on Lord Denning’s proposal, that inequality of bargaining power, 
unconscionability and reasonableness could be combined to form a general doctrine of 
inequality of bargaining power. Beale is of the opinion that even though the House of Lords 
deemed such a doctrine unnecessary the very essence or aim of the doctrine of inequality of 
bargaining power may persevere.6 Lord Denning explains that should English law recognise 
inequality of bargaining power,  such a doctrine ‘gives relief to one who, without independent 
advice, enters into a contract upon terms which are very unfair or transfers property for a 
consideration which is grossly inadequate, when his bargaining power is grievously impaired 
by reason of his own needs and desires, or by his own ignorance or infirmity, coupled with 
undue influences or pressures brought to bear on him by or for the benefit of the other'.7 
Thal states that the doctrine of inequality of bargaining power, which would include a 
standard of fairness, would limit the concept of freedom of contract as it prevents a person 
from validly entering into certain types of contracts, such as unfair contracts. He also 
suggests that the courts should not only be concerned with the enforcement of contracts but 
also the fairness of contracts.8 It is also important to note that freedom of contract and an 
                                                          
3 Beale (note 1 above) 125. 
4 Ibid 125. 
5 DD Barnhizer ‘Inequality of Bargaining Power’ (2005) 76 U. Colo.L.Rev. 139, 152. 
6 Beale (note 1 above) 125. 
7 Lloyds Bank v Bundy (1975) QB 326, 339. 
8 SN Thal ‘The Inequality of Bargaining Power Doctrine: The Problem of Defining Contractual Unfairness’ 





equity principle such as a doctrine of inequality of bargaining power are not contrasting 
concepts, rather they are complementary. It is submitted that when both these concepts are 
realised, these concepts balance out the unwanted extremes of each concept.9 When two 
parties engage in bargaining, such conduct sanctifies the promise or contract that follows. 
Based on such a premise it follows that it is the act of bargaining that is the basis of the 
principle of freedom of contract and the reason why a bargain that is made must be upheld 
(pacta sunt servanda).10 
When the bargaining power of the parties is analysed, this immediately calls for consideration 
of the fairness and equity of the contract. Although the ‘doctrine of inequality of bargaining 
power’ is not recognised in South African law, and there is no authoritative definition of 
bargaining power, it can be extrapolated from judgments that the courts will protect against 
certain situations of improper conduct in terms of contract law. The gist of bargaining power 
can be described as the capacity to influence the content of the contract.11 In order to define 
the term ‘bargaining power’, Sharrock makes reference to several factors recognised in South 
African law that are improper and limit a person’s bargaining power.12 These factors are: 
 no realistic bargaining alternatives available; 
 a lack of bargaining skill or inability to bargain due to a lack of education, lack of 
knowledge of the subject matter of the contract, inexperience in commercial or legal 
matters, or inability to read or understand the language of the contract (all factors that 
are prevalent in South Africa); 
 a physical or mental illness, mental disability, impaired faculties perhaps due to old 
age; 
 a lack of access to independent advice or material information concerning the 
transaction; and 





                                                          
9  Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) 13. 
10 Thal (note 8 above) 27.  
11 Sharrock (note 2 above) 140. 
12 Ibid 141. 





1.3 The Importance of Equality 
 
It is submitted that bargaining power is important in the context of a contract because an 
analysis of the bargaining power of each party will reveal whether or not the constitutional 
value of equality may have been implicated. The role of equality in a system of law is of 
immense value as it is aimed at neutralizing inequalities (something which, of course, is very 
prevalent in South Africa).  Section 1(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Act 108 of 1996 (Constitution) provides that equality is one of the values upon which our 
sovereign, democratic state is founded. The ideal of equality is further provided for in Section 
9 of the Constitution, which provides that the right to equality includes the full and equal 
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. By giving equality the strength to infuse itself in the 
law as both a right and a value, the Constitution seeks to protect against past injustices and 
the resultant inequalities.14  
 
The importance of equality is apparent when one considers that it is both an entrenched 
fundamental right and a foundational value in terms of the Constitution. As a right, equality 
can be directly relied upon, as it is the source of constitutional entitlements and also imposes 
obligations. As a value, equality allows substantive principles to be the guiding force in 
determining the lawfulness of a matter, even if not directly evoked because equality plays an 
informative role as a standard which all law must meet in order to be in line with the 
Constitution.15 
 
Section 39(2) of the Constitution provides that a court, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, 
must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, and is under a duty to develop the common law in line with the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. This clearly means that the court may of its 
own accord raise the issue of equality, even if the parties have not done so. This emphasises 
the relevance of the founding values of the Constitution to anyone who comes into contact 
with the law.16  
 
                                                          
14 T Deane & R Brijmohanlall ‘The Constitutional Court's approach to equality’ (2003) 44 Codicillus 92, 93; S 
Jagwanth ‘Expanding Equality’ (2005) Acta Juridica: Advancing Women's Rights: The first decade of 
democracy 131, 133; C Albertyn ‘Substantive Equality and Transformation in South Africa’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 
253, 258. 
15 Jagwanth (note 14 above) 313. 





As it is illogical to expect everyone to be equal in every respect, the Constitution requires that 
equality must be applied in a substantive, rather than formal, manner. A formal consideration 
of the state of equality of a situation does not take into account that not all people are faced 
with the same social and economic realities.17 Substantive equality can be defined as an ideal 
that is ‘remedial, restitutionary, context-sensitive, historically self-conscious, and group-
based in nature’.18 The concept of substantive equality forges ‘mutually supportive human 
relationships’19 at every level of society that centres on each person reaching their full 
potential as free citizens. This is how the value and right of equality promotes transformation 
from an individualistic, class conscious state to a more democratic, egalitarian state.20 A 
substantive equality approach demands a consideration of the social and economic realities of 
the past that have resulted in the inequalities faced by people today, which also provides for 
the value of human dignity.21 Heralded as ‘a remedy to systemic and entrenched inequalities’ 
substantive equality demands of judges and lawyers to determine and understand the context 
of the matter at hand by interrogating the relationship between the vulnerable and the 
powerful to determine the parties’ social and economic situations.22 In light of the above 
description of substantive equality, it is submitted that substantive equality demands a 
consideration of the context of the matter, which includes the bargaining power of the parties. 
 
1.4 The Effect of Substantive Equality on the Classical Liberal Theory of Contract Law 
 
Contract law is founded on principles of pacta sunt servanda and freedom of contract. In 
other words, all contracts that are seriously entered into must be enforced because everyone 
has the freedom to contract.23 South African contract law is characterized by a ‘laissez-faire 
economic liberalism’ and a ‘noninterventionist, individualistic approach’.24 This ethos can be 
described as encouraging ‘the pursuit of self-interest’ to the exclusion of a consideration of 
                                                          
17 Deane & Brijmohanlall (note 14 above) 93-94 
18 D Bhana, M Pieterse ‘Toward a Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and Afrox 
Revisited’ 2005 SALJ 865, 880. 
19 Ibid, 880. 
20Albertyn (note 14 above) 255; Bhana & Pieterse (note 18 above) 880. 
21 Deane & Brijmohanlall (note 14 above) 94; Jagwanth (note 14 above) 132.  
22Albertyn (note 14 above) 259; L Hawthorne ‘Legal Tradition and the Transformation of Orthodox Contract 
Theory: The Movement from Formalism to Realsim’ (2006) 12 Fundamina: A Journal of Legal History 71, 88. 
23 Bhana & Pieterse (note 18 above) 866; L Hawthorn ‘The ‘New Learning’ and Transformation of Contract 
Law: Reconciling the Rule of Law with the Constitutional Imperative to Social Transformation’ (2008) 23 SA 
Publiek-SA Public Law 77, 80. 





others’ interests.25 In the late 18th century the principle of freedom of contract incorporated a 
requirement of fairness in contractual dealings. However in the 19th century, with the rise of 
the commercial class, freedom of contract abandoned the role of ensuring good faith relations 
and equality considerations and focussed on ensuring performance of contracts.26 
 
In terms of this liberal theory of contract law, judicial intervention is generally viewed as 
disturbing the principle of freedom of contact.  Therefore, the manner in which substantive 
equity is enforced in contract law is being neglected by the courts, who focus more on the 
formal validity and enforcement of contracts.27 On this interpretation of pacta sunt servanda 
and freedom of contract, the law of contract can be said to be in line with the classical liberal 
theory.28 
 
In order to properly realise the value of substantive equality in contract law it is imperative 
for the courts to adopt a more normative approach,29 involving a consideration of the realities 
faced by people, realities that may limit their bargaining power. Under a classical liberal 
understanding of the law, the protection of the freedom of an individual is likely to be 
favoured over issues of equality, which would rarely enter the equation. However, now that 
equality is considered in the context of a transformative tool under the Constitution, the 
freedom of an individual must be considered along with the demands of substantive equality. 
Therefore a proper consideration of equality would have a limiting effect on individualistic 
notions.30 Based on this point it is submitted that upon a full realisation of the value of 
substantive equality, the negative aspects of the classical liberal theory of contract law can be 
neutralised. 
 
Chapter 2 of this study will critically analyze the conservative manner in which courts have 
dealt with substantive equality to date, and by implication the relative bargaining power of 
contracting parties. This conservative stance has been criticized for not facilitating a proper 
realization of the constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality.31 This study will 
                                                          
25 AJ Barnard-Naude ‘”Oh what a tangled web we weave ...” Hegemony, freedom of contract, good faith and 
transformation – Towards a politics of friendship in the politics of contract’ 2008 (1) Constitutional Court 
Review 155, 164. 
26 Ibid 162. 
27 Bhana & Pieterse (note 18 above) 867. 
28 Ibid 868. 
29 Ibid 872. 
30 Ibid 880. 





consider whether, upon a full realization of these values, unequal bargaining power will be 
afforded a different, and possibly more prominent role in contract law. 
 
Chapter 3 will analyze the context in which contracts are entered into, and the many factors 
that limit a party’s bargaining power. There are many limitations on bargaining power such 
as issues of time, effort and cost, psychological factors, the reality of competition in the 
market place and existence of monopolies. It is only upon an examination of the realities 
faced by each party in each case that a court can determine if there was improper conduct. 
This chapter will illustrate how contract law is in desperate need of scrutiny through the lens 
of substantive equality. 
 
Contracts are concluded every day and such inequalities are prevalent in many of them. 
These unfair practices have been recognized by legislation, in the form of (for example) the 
Consumer Protection Act32 and Labour Relations Act,33 which govern the relationship 
between certain contracting parties. This is indicative of the fact that often in contractual 
relationships there is an abuse of power, and without the strength of the law ‘the strong’ will 
continue to oppress ‘the weak’ and the state has taken protective measures by passing such 
legislation.34 
 
There are also measures in ordinary contract law to deal with improper conduct in terms of a 
contract, such as already defined concepts of duress, undue influence and misrepresentation. 
However, it is submitted that substantive equality can be more fully realized if these concepts 
are adapted to properly consider the reality of unequal bargaining power in each case. In this 
regard the focus of this study will be on what will be suggested are eminently suitable 
mechanisms for this purpose, namely the concepts of good faith, Ubuntu, public policy and 
the development of a doctrine of economic duress. 
 
Chapter 4 will examine a number of judgments that were characterized by a cautious 
approach to the defense of public policy, even though the concept of public policy is still 
referred to by many judges as a fundamental concept in our society.35 It would appear that 
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these concepts are still not sufficient to invalidate a contract characterized by unfairness, 
because the focus of the courts is on enforceability (judged predominantly on a formal level) 
rather than determining substantive fairness of the contract. However, upon an analysis of 
recent case law, it is possible to conclude that concepts such as public policy, good faith as 
well as Ubuntu are beginning to find a more solid footing in contract law. After considering 
such transformative progress from form to substance, this study examine whether the current 
role of unequal bargaining power is likely to persist in light of such developments. 
 
Chapter 5 will suggest a doctrine of economic duress as a mechanism to better realize the 
inequalities faced by contracting parties. As is evident in South African society, there is an 
ever-increasing gap between the commercial class and the working class. When consideration 
is given to the prevalence of poverty and illiteracy, this results in an environment where 
instances of economic duress and undue influence may run rife in contractual transactions on 
a daily basis. This study will explore whether substantive equity and equality in contractual 
relations is actually realized by these two concepts. 
 
The ultimate goal of this study is to shed light on the appropriate role to be played by unequal 
bargaining power in the future development of South African contract law. 
 
To further illustrate the need for reform within contract law, the South African Law Reform 
Commission proposed a draft bill on unfair contracts and contract terms, which 
recommended that courts should be allowed to strike down a contract that is found to be 
unreasonable, unconscionable or oppressive.  The Commission stated that South African law 
is out of step with foreign law, which has generally accepted measures to regulate the fairness 
of contracts. The Commission pointed out that this may discourage foreign investors from 
considering South Africa when our courts are unable to determine the substantive fairness of 
a contact.36  
However, Parliament has not yet considered the proposed draft bill, and Brand comments that 
it is unlikely that the legislature will promulgate such legislation as envisioned in the Law 
Reform Commission’s proposed draft bill, given that the legislature has only promulgated 
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legislation in terms of specific types of contracts37 (such as consumer protection and labour 
legislation). However, as will be discussed in chapter 2, the courts are well equipped to 
remedy unreasonable, unconscionable and oppressive contracts by establishing a more 




















                                                          
37 FDJ Brand ‘The Role of Good Faith, Equity and Fairness in the South African Law of Contract: The influence 
of the Common Law and the Constitution’ (2009) 126 SALJ 71, 77. 
38 T Naudé ‘Unfair Contract Terms Legislation: The Implications of Why We Need it for its Formulation and 





2. THE COURTS TREATMENT OF UNEQUAL BARGAINING POWER 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In a society like ours founded in a largely capitalist environment,39 a person can start a 
business, own it privately if they wish and keep all profits for themselves. Concepts such as 
autonomy, self-determination, and the freedom to contract with minimal state interference 
create an environment for private business to grow exponentially.  
Any transaction that occurs in an economy or market is governed by a contract entered into 
by the parties to the transaction. In such a competitive environment it is not hard to imagine 
that contracts between private individuals may not exemplify perfect equality between the 
parties, as one party is often in a much more powerful bargaining position and each party, 
generally, wants to secure a deal that is in their best interests. 
It is impossible to require that each person be on absolute equal standing for a contract to be 
valid,40 because everyone has a different skill set, a different background, and often unequal 
access to resources. So it follows that these differences cannot always render a contract 
invalid.  Ideally, a court will accept certain imbalances in bargaining power as being present, 
but will only see fit to intervene when one party has taken an unfair advantage of the other 
and acted contrary to good faith.41 It is submitted that this would entail a substantive 
approach to equality in contract law. 
Many legal academics are of the opinion that the current interpretation and application of the 
law of contract (which lacks substantive equality considerations42) favours the dominant 
class, by legitimising concepts and ideals that are in the interests of this dominant class, so 
that the dominated class accepts this domination as being the correct state of affairs.43 The 
dominant classes comprise of the commercial class while the dominated class can be 
summarised as the working class.  
                                                          
39 D Bhana ‘The Law of Contract and the Constitution: Barkhuizen v Napier (SCA)’ 2007 SALJ 269, 278. 
40Graham Glover The Doctrine of Duress in the Law of Contract and Unjustified Enrichment in South Africa 
(PHD Thesis, Rhodes University, 2004) 155-156. 
41 Glover (note 40 above) 155; MH Ogilve ‘Economic Duress, Inequality of bargaining power and Threatened 
Breach of Contract’ (1981) 26 McGill Law Journal 289, 311. 
42 Barnard-Naude (note 25 above) 162- 163; Bhana & Pieterse (note 18 above) 872. 





A close examination of earlier contract law cases will illustrate the sometimes blatant side-
lining of the weak socio economic position of the dominated class to maintain the tyrannical 
reign of the oppressive commercial class.44 This has been facilitated on occasion by the 
courts, who have not fully realised constitutional values due to a mechanical application of 
principles of contract law without considering the courts’ transformative mandate45. This 
distinctive treatment of constitutional values can be illustrated by the manner in which courts 
deal with substantive equality and thereby the abuse of superior bargaining power that occurs 
between most contracting parties.  
An examination of the case law will further reveal a trend which favours the belief that 
judicial interference in terms of the substance of a contract is not in line with the value of 
freedom of contract.46 This belief begs the question of whether other underlying values of 
contract law are shown the same measure of protection. It is submitted that values of equity 
and good faith are not,47 and disparity in approach will be questioned. 
Some academics are of the opinion that only the enactment of legislation can remedy the 
situation by giving the courts a mandate to examine the fairness and reasonableness of a 
contract.48 However, it is respectfully submitted that the courts already are subject to a duty 
(and are well equipped) to ensure that contracts are substantively fair and equitable,49 as will 
be revealed in the following discussion on recent contract case law.  
The rest of this chapter will discuss the cases of Brisley v Drotsky,50 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v 
Strydom,51 and Napier v Barkhuizen,52 to establish the manner in which the Supreme Court of 
Appeal (SCA) has dealt with constitutional values in contract law. This will be followed by 
consideration of the pivotal Constitutional Court (CC) judgement of Barkhuizen v Napier,53 
after which the focus will shift to distinctly different judgements by the lower courts in 
                                                          
44 Barnard-Naude (note 25 above), 162. 
45 Hawthorne (note 22 above) 75. 
46 J Lewis ‘Fairness in South African Contract Law’ (2003) 120 SALJ 330, 330; Bhana & Pieterse (note 18 
above) 867. 
47Barnard-Naude (note 25 above), 184. 
48 Lewis (note 46 above) 362. 
49 Naudé (note 79 above) 362; Bhana & Pieterse (note 18 above) 872. 
50 Brisley (note 35 above). 
51 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) 
52 Napier (note 9 above) 14. 





Jordan v Farber54 and Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of 
South Africa.55 
 
2.2 Brisley v Drotsky 
The case of Brisley v Drotsky56 is considered a landmark judgement in which the SCA 
banished the concepts of good faith, boni mores and fairness to the realm of ‘soft law’, as 
concepts lacking sufficient weight to affect the validity of a contract. The court explained that 
these concepts are not independent, substantive rules that can be directly applied by courts, 
rather they are abstract values that ‘perform creative, informative and controlling functions 
through established rules of contract law’57.  In terms of bargaining power, although the court 
did acknowledge that there is often an inconsistency in the levels of bargaining power 
between contracting parties, it surmised that in terms of the non-variation clause which was at 
issue in this case the relative bargaining positions did not come into issue. This case analysis 
will outline the harsh reality that if good faith, boni mores and fairness are afforded such 
content as they are given in this case, the result will have a domino effect on the manner in 
which bargaining power is dealt with by the courts. In other words the version of contract law 
that fully realises the concept of good faith, boni mores and fairness will more easily identify 
and effectively deal with abuses of bargaining power in contractual disputes.  
 
The case of Brisley v Drotsky concerned a lease agreement which contained a non-variation 
clause. The lessee relied on an oral variation made to the contract, while the lessor relied on 
the Shifren principle, which states that, in terms of a non-variation clause in a contract, a 
variation will only be valid when it is reduced to writing and signed by both parties. In a 
counter argument the lessee put forward that Olivier J’s minority judgement in Saayman58 
showed that the courts could strike out a clause in a contract if it was found to be contrary to 
public policy.  In the case of Saayman Olivier J argued that the concept of good faith is 
inherent in the concept of public policy and it is required that all contracts are entered into in 
good faith. Ultimately, Olivier J held that it was within the courts’ power to strike down a 
contract that is contrary to the concept of good faith, and therefore contrary to public policy. 
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The court in Brisley disagreed with the lessee and explained that the minority judgement in 
Saayman was characterised by a value judgement of one judge, with whom the other four 
judges on the bench in that case disagreed that such principles, if contravened, are sufficient 
for a court to interfere in contractual relations of private parties. The court warned that when 
judges use their own moral compass to determine if a contractual provision should be 
enforced or not, there is a real danger of legal and commercial uncertainty.59 If the law was 
made by a value judgement in each case, the boundaries of what is right and wrong would 
change with every case and no one would know with accuracy, where those boundaries lie. 
The court therefore maintained that it does not have the power to invalidate an otherwise 
valid contract. 
 
Olivier JA did concur with the majority in Brisley, that the Shifren principle should not be 
simply overturned because it would most definitely lead to uncertainty and a great measure of 
chaos. However in his judgement he emphasised an important point regarding the majority’s 
foreboding prediction of legal uncertainty should principles like good faith be applied directly 
to contract law, which was not in line with the majority’s opinion. Olivier JA is of the 
opinion that the principle of good faith, founded on constitutional values, should be more 
fully realised in contract law. As paraphrased by Bhana and Pieterse, Olivier JA surmises that 
a court should task itself with protecting those in a weaker bargaining position as such an 
approach will be in line with ‘societal notions of contractual justice’60  and that the resulting 
legal uncertainty was necessary to create a justice system that cherishes legal fairness as well 
as legal certainty. The clear message emanating from Olivier JA’s judgement is that the next 
step for contract law is to reach a point where the need for legal certainty is not abandoned 
but the social realities of a person are equally taken into account. 
 
Furthermore, the majority of the court reasoned that once the nature of the non-variation 
clause was considered (namely that it serves to ensure all variations to the contract are 
reduced to writing and signed by both parties), it becomes apparent that both the weak and 
strong party are equally protected by such a clause. The court also surmised that a non-
variation clause (which is purported to protect both parties) is freely negotiated into a contract 
by both parties, and therefore discrepancies in bargaining power are not an issue in terms of 
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non-variation clauses. Cameron JA, in a separate concurring judgement, considered the 
content of the values that underlie the Constitution. The judge demonstrated an interpretative 
approach as he acknowledged the court’s duty to reconsider the Shifren principle, a common 
law principle, in light of its duty to develop the common law in line with constitutional values 
(which seemed to deviate from the usual positivist approach taken by the majority).61 
Cameron JA reasoned that the Shifren principle has been an accepted part of contract law for 
four decades and has remained so because of the commercial and social certainty it has 
brought to contract law. He stated that ‘[c]onstitutional considerations of equality do not 
detract from it. On the contrary, they seem to me to enhance it’, and he further agreed with 
the majority that a non-variation clause seeks to protect both weak and strong parties and 
perhaps it even protects the weaker party more.62 
 
The court did not consider the realities faced by each party and how these factors effected 
their bargaining power. In this case the lessor had purchased a standard form lease agreement 
from a shop. The terms of such an agreement are weighted in favour of the lessor as the 
lessor was protected by an exemption clause while the lessee was obligated to pay for any 
damages he caused to the property through negligence or otherwise. Additionally, the non-
variation clause usually appears to be worded in favour of the lessor only and the lessor is 
permitted to cancel the contract for certain reasons while the lessee has no such right to 
cancellation.63 In light of such realities it is unlikely that the lease agreement embodied 
substantive fairness from the perspective of the lessee. 
 
It is apparent that this particular conclusion by the court, that the non-variation clause seeks 
to protect both parties, is based on the premise that the clause was in fact freely negotiated 
and agreed upon. The court here clearly favoured freedom of contract over any equality 
considerations.64 As Bhana and Pieterse argue, there is a worrying version of freedom applied 
by the court in this case.65 Freedom of contract can be described as the epitome of a non-
interventionist and individualistic approach to contract law.66 In other words a person is free 
to choose with whom they want to contract and on which terms they will contract, and any 
interference from forces outside of themselves is approached with caution. The rules of 
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contract law became so defined that they could be applied mechanically in each situation 
because any interference by the judicial system is seen as inimical to the concept of 
individual autonomy.67 This led to courts concentrating on the formal validity of a contract, 
and the importance of the enforcement of contracts rather than the substantive fairness of the 
contract.68 An unfortunate result is that defined rules on concepts like fairness, good faith and 
the boni mores were not sufficiently established in contract law. 
 
Academic critics believe that a version of contract law has emerged in which the interests of 
the commercial class trumps those of the non-commercial or working class.69 Barnard-Naude 
describe this trend as the hegemonic nature of freedom of contract within contract law.70 In 
other words, the current version of contract law favours the interests of the commercial class 
over those of the working class. To further elaborate, the courts seem to attach more weight 
to concepts such as the sanctity of contract and individual autonomy, which centres around 
enforcing contracts ( which benefit the commercial class) rather than the courts concentrating 
on determining whether concepts of fairness, good faith and the boni mores are evident in the 
terms of, and circumstances surrounding, the contract. This version of contract law will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 4. 
 
This understanding of contract law supports a significantly lacking version of freedom of 
contract. Bhana and Pieterse allude to the fact that there is a reason why the Constitution does 
not explicitly entrench the freedom to contract. With reference to the global perspective of 
human rights lawyers, on such economic liberties such as freedom of contract being 
entrenched in international law and being awarded fundamental human rights status, perhaps 
our Constitution does not explicitly provide for a freedom to contract because of its bias 
towards the interests of the commercial class, thus leaving the working class in a vulnerable 
position. 71 
 
The CC, in the case of Ferreira v Levin72, was of the opinion that the freedom of a person 
would only in rare cases concern more than the physical integrity of a person, and that the 
court was not prepared to comment on the impact which a person’s freedom may have on 
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other liberty interests such as the freedom of contract. Bhana and Pieterse, with reference to 
Bronsword and Van der Walt, observe that a very narrow version of freedom is applied in our 
courts, and this version of freedom falls short of the classical liberal ideal of freedom, which 
includes the freedom of the person, freedom of economic activity and freedom of association 
and other rights based on the classical concept of liberty. 73 
  
Most importantly, for the purposes of considering bargaining power, this version of freedom 
does not look past the physical integrity of a person, thereby circumventing the social 
realities that weigh on a person’s freedom. At this point it is interesting to note how Barnard-
Naude explains the oppression by the dominant commercial class, namely that it may be 
evident by a simple ‘silencing of an alternative perspective’.74  It becomes apparent that the 
court in Brisley, in stating that the issue of the bargaining power of the parties does not arise 
regarding the non-variation clause avoided considering the circumstances that may have 
weighed on the freedom of the weaker party to agree to the non-variation clause. In other 
words the court silenced this alternative perspective. 
 
Ultimately it was the ominous prediction by the majority in Brisley of impending chaos 
should such abstract values of good faith, fairness and the boni mores be directly applied to a 
determination of a contract’s validity, that spawned a string of cases which has cemented the 
individualistic and autonomous interests of the commercial class into contract law, thereby 
conveniently side-stepping the vital need to take into consideration the social realities that 
weigh on a party’s freedom to contract, or in other words their bargaining power. 
 
2.3 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom  
Shortly after Brisley came the case of Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom75. In this case 
Strydom was a patient in a private hospital owned by Afrox. Strydom had signed a standard 
form contract which contained an exemption clause excusing the hospital from negligence 
committed by the hospital’s nursing staff. Strydom sued Afrox for the negligence he suffered 
and Afrox relied on the exemption clause to escape liability. Strydom’s defence was two-
pronged: he first relied on section 27 of the Constitution (the right for every person to 
medical treatment) and secondly that the clause was simply contrary to good faith, public 
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policy and the spirit of the Bill of Rights, which Bhana and Pieterse explain, would include 
the right to reasonable and professional care76. Strydom further submitted that the clause was 
contrary to good faith, public policy and the spirit of the Bill of Rights because he had 
inferior bargaining power when he was confronted with the standard form contract at the 
hospital.  
The SCA here held that bargaining power was a factor to be considered in the determination 
of whether a contract was contrary to public policy. However, even if a party was in a 
stronger bargaining position, it cannot be said that the contract favours that party and is 
therefore against public policy.77 The court held that there was no evidence to prove that 
Strydom was actually in a weaker bargaining position when the contract was signed. 
However it is submitted that if the context of the contract was properly taken into 
consideration, the unequal bargaining positions of the parties would have been obvious. The 
reality facing many patients who sign the admission form may have already made 
arrangements78 that would be impractical to cancel or postpone because of an exemption 
clause in the admission form.79 The failure of the court to properly consider the realities of 
the parties is indicative of political and economic policies influence a formalistic application 
of contract principles over a context sensitive approach in line with substantive equality.80 
Furthermore the court held that since Strydom had not contended that the damages he 
suffered was due to the gross negligence of an employee of the hospital, therefore it would be 
irrelevant to consider whether the exemption clause runs afoul of principles of public policy. 
Immediately it would seem that the SCA is hesitant to develop the law on exemption clauses 
to include public policy considerations. This would further support the contention that the law 
is individualistic in nature. 
Bhana and Pieterse believe that Brand JA’s argument, which relies on Cameron JA’s 
judgement in Brisley, is cause for concern stemming from the conclusion reached by Brand 
JA, that freedom of contract, and thereby sanctity of contract, is in fact a constitutional value. 
Furthermore Brandt JA reiterated the prediction of chaos and uncertainty should abstract 
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values such as public policy be directly applied to contract law.81 These findings held by 
Brand are described as erroneous, worrying and out of step with the constitutional ethos82.   
Freedom of contract is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, perhaps there is a 
reason why this is so. Many human rights lawyers, on a global level, are against the idea of 
trade related rights such as freedom of contract being entrenched in international law, because 
of the version of law it created, namely a version of law that supports the interest of the 
commercial class.83  
From the above discussion of Brisley and Afrox it is clear that freedom of contract is applied 
in such a way that it has become a concept that is deeply entrenched in the common law, 
while the values of dignity and equality are denied the same application in order to temper 
freedom’s undesirable excesses.  The constitutional value of equality would demand an 
examination of the realities faced by each party, which includes the bargaining power of each 
party. The Afrox judgement has been described as illustrating ‘the tension between adherence 
to the rule of law and application of norms, which promote substantive justice’.84 
In South Africa, given the social and economic reality, often the bargaining power of a 
person is restricted, if not totally absent. The reality that faced the parties in both these cases 
(the lease agreement in Brisley and the hospital admission form in Afrox) cannot be said to 
have been considered in light of the context-sensitive constitutional value of equality, and 
therefore the value of freedom of contract was given an undesirable status, which is not 
tempered with realities faced by the relevant contracting parties. 
Naude and Lubbe propose that, if the facts of Afrox were viewed through the context-
sensitive teleological approach, the courts’ treatment of freedom of contract may have been 
different.85 This approach will now be considered to illustrate a substantive approach to the 
facts in Afrox. The teleological approach is based on an ‘essentialia-naturalia model’ and 
requires a contract to be examined in its specific context to determine the nature and essence, 
or end purpose, of the contract. Once the nature and essence is determined, certain 
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obligations become apparent.86 The difference between the essentialia and naturalia is 
described as follows: 
The essentialia of a contract were regarded as the obligations entailed by its definition. They are 
included in or encompassed by ‘the concepts used to formulate the definition’. The naturalia or 
natural terms of a contract were the means to the end expressed in the definition of the contract. 
That a party who desired the end would also desire the means, justified reading terms into the 
contract.87 
The teleological approach requires that the terms of the contract agreed to by the parties must 
not be contrary to the end purpose or essentialia of the contract. This places a limitation on 
what the parties could agree upon.88 Although this approach had been side-lined due to the 
rise of the commercial class, and with it the classical liberal theory, this line of reasoning is in 
the process of being resurrected in modern legal theory and is still reflected in context-
sensitive doctrines of contract law.89 
Evidence of such an ideology is present in the context of the rules regarding sale in contract 
law. As observed by Naude and Lubbe, the case of Vrystaat Motors v Henry Blignaut 
Motors90 is illustrative of this approach. In this case it was found that even when a clause 
exempting liability in terms of eviction is present in a contract, a seller is duty bound to pay 
back the purchase price upon eviction of the purchaser. The reasoning is that the principle of 
reciprocity provides that the seller will give undisturbed possession of the property in 
exchange for the purchase price. It follows that if the seller is allowed to exclude that duty of 
reciprocity, because of an exemption clause excluding his liability in terms of an eviction, 
this exclusion clause will run contrary to the essence of the contract.91 
It is important to note that this approach would not function without a consideration of the 
context of the contract and a recognition of the human virtues demanded as a result of 
concluding a contract. These virtues, such as promise keeping, liberality and commutative 
justice promote an ideal of a better life in which people maintain a moral standard in their 
transactions.92  Such an ethical approach which looks to the context of the matter, while 
demanding a standard of moral behaviour, is an important aspect of the law according to 
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modern legal theory, as stated by Naude and Lubbe93 and will be discussed further on in this 
study. 
In Afrox the court held that a person is bound by a contract they have signed even if they had 
not read the contract. However if the assertor had failed to point out a certain provision where 
there was a legal duty to do so, then the contract could be avoided by a person who did not 
read the contract they had signed.94 The court held that exemption clauses were the norm and 
are therefore not unexpected, so Strydom was bound by the clause as if he had expressly 
agreed to it.95 
Naude and Lubbe propose that where a clause runs contrary to the essence of a contract by 
displacing the reciprocity between contracting parties, such a clause is unexpected.96 It is 
reasoned that a person, when confronted with a particular contract, may reasonably expect the 
contract to contain certain terms, none of which are contrary to the purpose of the contract. It 
follows, as established by the SCA in Mercurius Motors v Lopez,97that the assertor is under a 
duty to point out any clauses that run contrary to the purpose of the contract because those 
clauses are unexpected. 
The aim of this context-sensitive approach of recognising an unexpected clause to be one that 
is contrary to the purpose of the contract stands to serve the greater purpose of encouraging 
communication between parties that use standard form contracts, regarding the content of the 
contract. This would not only afford a party the opportunity to negotiate an amendment or to 
look elsewhere for the desired product or service,98 but it would also go some way in order to 
balance the bargaining power of each party by encouraging the divulgence of information to 
the less well-informed party. 
Turning back to the facts of Afrox, it is submitted that the context of the matter was not 
properly taken into consideration. The contract was between the patient and a hospital or 
doctor (which amounts to the same thing). The essence of the contract is for the doctor to ‘act 
with the degree of skill and care reasonably to be expected of an average practitioner in the 
field’ in return for a fee.99 It follows that by acting in a negligent manner the doctor is in 
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breach of a fundamental purpose of the contract. Therefore, permitting an exemption clause 
in terms of a medical service contract would run contrary to the essence of the contract:  
To permit an exclusion of the liability for negligence and to water down the duty of the medical 
service provider to a mere duty to expend time and labour on the patient irrespective of the 
quality of the treatment, is to reduce the protection of the patient to a level that undermines the 
principle of reciprocity. By subverting the character of the transaction as an exchange, the 
exemption offends against the underlying principle of good faith and the dignity of the 
patient.100 
What is clear from Naude and Lubbe’s informative study on a proposed approach to the 
issues that arose in Afrox is that there is a need for a context-sensitive analysis of the matter 
in which an exemption clause operates. The reason for this is that once the realities of the 
parties are brought to light, certain inconsistencies become obvious. One of the realities is 
that the contract cannot be categorised as a commercial transaction as this allows the court to 
conveniently side-step the issues surrounding the nature of a doctor/patient relationship, 
namely that a patient is in a vulnerable position because he is dependent on the care provided 
by the hospital.101  
What becomes evident is that by enforcing the exemption clause the court favoured the 
commercial interests of the hospital at the expense of the interests of the patient, simply 
because the realities faced by the patient were not fully considered. It is submitted that there 
is a need for a context-sensitive approach to exemption clauses. This promotes an 
examination of the realities faced by each party when the contract was signed and this could 
reveal factors which may have inhibited the bargaining power of a party.102 
However, according to the teleological approach, rendering every contractual provision null 
and void that is contrary to the essence of a contract would lead to the harsh consequence, in 
some instances, of not giving effect to the will of the parties. For this reason Naude and 
Lubbe propose that: 
[t]he proper approach would be to investigate the implications of Thomistic reasoning for the 
established approach to public policy as the general standard for the enforceability of 
contracts and contractual terms.103  
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In this way, by identifying a clause that is contrary to the essence of a contract may show that 
one of the parties’ autonomy or ability to negotiate is inhibited. Naude and Lubbe envisioned 
a requirement to consider the context of the matter along with a moral standard of expected 
behaviour to help inform the concept of public policy. The definition of the concept of public 
policy provided subsequently in the case of Barkhuizen v Napier104 was not all that dissimilar 
to the concept envisioned by Naude and Lubbe. 
 
2.4 Napier v Barkhuizen  
In the case of Barkhuizen v Napier105 the CC was called upon to determine the 
constitutionality of a time-limitation clause in a short-term insurance contract. This clause 
prevents the insured, who is making a claim, from instituting legal action if summons is not 
served on the insurance company within the time limit set out in the clause. It was contended 
that the clause violates the right to approach a court for redress as entrenched in section 34 of 
the Bill of Rights, and it is therefore unconstitutional.106  
 
The High Court had found in favour of the plaintiff’s argument that upon a direct application 
of section 34 of the Constitution to these facts, the time bar clause is unconstitutional because 
it gave the insured an unreasonably short time to take action and served no legitimate 
purpose. Bhana is of the opinion that the High Court in this case had fully realised its 
constitutional duty to develop the law in line with the spirit purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights, as clearly stated in section 39 of the Constitution.107 This is described as a 
‘progressive normative engagement with constitutional values’,108 but the High Court 
judgement was overturned by the SCA. 
The SCA judgment does acknowledge its duty in terms of section 39 of the Constitution, 
however the judgment also echoed the principles from Brisley and Afrox, namely that 
although a court is obliged to develop the common law to give life to the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Constitution, a judge cannot strike down a contract based on his or her own 
opinion of what is fair, just or in good faith.109 
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However the SCA further stated that: 
Crucially, in this calculus 'public policy' now derives from the founding constitutional values of 
human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and 
freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism.110 
The SCA expressed that a contract may be declared invalid based on it being proved to be 
contrary to public policy, which comprises of constitutional values such as human dignity, 
equality and freedom among others.111 
The SCA’s acknowledgement of the relative bargaining position of the parties, namely that it 
is a factor to be considered when determining whether a contract was invalid due to it being 
contrary to public policy,112 is a welcome step113 towards the realisation of substantive 
equality in contract law. This acknowledgement shows that the unequal bargaining power of 
a party will be considered as a factor in determining if a contract is contrary to public policy 
and therefore void, and this is a definite step forward towards a balance between a formalistic 
version of contract law and a version that takes substantive equality into consideration. 
The Court went further to state that the cases of Brisley and Afrox have ‘opened the door to 
precisely such determinations’.114 With reference to Afrox, the court explained that the 
constitutional values of dignity and equality are affected by the parties relative bargaining 
positions.115 It clear that a consideration of the bargaining position of the parties must be 
taken into account by the courts, if the courts hope to fully realise its duty to develop the 
common law in tune with constitutional values.  
The court held that due to a dearth of evidence, it could only speculate on what the plaintiff's 
bargaining position was in relation to the insurer. The court went further to explain that there 
was no evidence regarding the following:116 
 the market in short-term insurance products;  
 whether a variety of such products is available;  
 the number of suppliers and their relative market share;  
 whether all or most short-term insurers impose a time-bar;  
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 whether a diversity of time-limits is  available to those seeking short-term insurance 
cover, and over what range they fall;  
 whether for a person in the plaintiff's position (who travels in a vehicle seemingly 
appurtenant to a reasonably affluent middle-class lifestyle) short-term vehicle 
insurance is an optional convenience, or an essential attribute of life.  
 
The court explained that without such information the court could not address what it termed 
‘the broader constitutional challenge’.117 The court ultimately held that the time bar clause 
did not infringe the plaintiff’s right of access to court, and there was no evidence to prove that 
the contract was not entered into freely or in violation of his constitutional rights to freedom, 
dignity and equality.118 
However, the SCA did not actually consider the realities faced by people looking for short 
term insurance. The insured would have been presented with a lengthy contract of complex 
clauses, steeped in legalese, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.119 The individual, who most likely 
does not have extensive product knowledge nor the time, money or energy to read the 
contract, let alone actually negotiate on the terms, is most likely to sign the contract as a 
direct result of being in a weaker bargaining position. This is so especially in light of the high 
levels of motor vehicle thefts and accidents, the high cost of buying a car, and the inadequate 
public transport system in South Africa.120 In this way the insured agrees to the time 
limitation clause, which is buried in the complex contract and the insurer has the protection of 
such a clause to ‘escape the very liability it undertook to cover’.121 It is interesting that if 
Naude and Lubbe’s proposed context-sensitive, teleological approach122, which operates from 
the premise that a contract’s terms must not run contrary to the purpose of a contract, is 
applied, one would most likely find, for the same reasons as mentioned above, that the 
insured’s bargaining power was inhibited and this may therefore contribute towards proving 
the clause to be contrary to public policy. This further shows how considering the realities 
faced by the parties, in a substantive equality approach, is likely to yield a different result 
which is more in line with constitutional values. 
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It is clear, after considering Brisley and Afrox,that the SCA tends to hold that because a 
person has the freedom to contract, judicial interference in contracts freely entered into may 
be a violation of that freedom. This is in line with a classical liberal understanding of freedom 
of contract:123 A classical liberal or formalistic version of contract law in which the court 
reasons that each person is afforded the dignity and freedom to enter into a contract as they 
wish and therefore each contract is an expression of their will, and to protect the sanctity and 
stability of contract law such a contract must be enforced.124  
The manner in which the SCA dealt with the values of freedom, dignity and equality shows 
that such an approach was applied by the SCA in Napier. The SCA favours an 
empowerment-based version of dignity, which holds that a person’s dignity is intertwined 
with their right to freely enter into a contract.125 It follows that by not interfering in contracts 
that are freely entered into, the courts protect the dignity of an individual. The sister 
conception of dignity is the constraint-based version of dignity which recognises ‘the intrinsic 
moral worth of all human beings, which is deserving of protection even if it places a 
constraint on freedom’126 and ultimately this constraint-based dignity may demand judicial 
control.127 Such an approach would look to the realities faced by the parties to determine if 
the exercise of freedom of contract does infringe on the dignity of the person, and given the 
transformative duty of the courts, such an approach would be appropriate.128 In furtherance of 
pursuing its transformative duty, an analysis by the court of the realities faced by the parties 
would immediately implicate a consideration of whether substantive equality exists between 
the contracting parties.  
However, the SCA considered the values of dignity and equality in terms of a classical liberal 
understanding and this has resulted in the undesirable excess of freedom of contract to 
prevail.129 In other words, the application of freedom of contract in this way excludes 
‘constitutional standards of fairness, equality and human dignity’.130  Therefore Napier 
ultimately results in a narrow realisation of freedom of contract that is not imbued with the 
full force of the concept of liberty.131 The practical result is that a person may be forced to 
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contract out of a constitutional right, such as the right of access to court, as well as other 
fundamental rights. Allowing such a practice would only serve to further entrench the 
unequal bargaining power prevalent in South Africa today. Therefore it is submitted that 
there is a desperate need to reconsider the application of dignity and substantive equality,132 
so that the bargaining realities faced by contracting parties can be fully appreciated and the 
constitutional duty of the courts to do so will be fulfilled. In this manner the constitutional 
values of freedom, dignity and equality operate in union, balancing each other out.133 
 
2.5 Barkhuizen v Napier 
The CC ultimately confirmed the finding in the SCA, however, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 4 of this study, although the CC judgement did provide a light at the end of the 
classical liberal tunnel. This judgement has been described as important, because it highlights 
the role contract law has to play in creating a more equal and just society by recognising the 
horizontal application of human rights and constitutional values.134 
The CC first confirmed the meaning of public policy. The court held that public policy 
‘represents the legal convictions of the community; it represents those values that are held 
most dear by the society’.135 The CC further explained that public policy ‘is now deeply 
rooted in our Constitution and the values that underlie it’, values of ‘human dignity, the 
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms, and the rule of 
law.136It follows that a contract term that runs contrary to the values underlying the 
Constitution will be contrary to public policy and ultimately unenforceable.137  
The CC broke down the public policy enquiry into two questions: Firstly the CC asked 
whether the clause was unreasonable and secondly, if the term was reasonable, and 
considering the circumstances that have prevented compliance with the time limitation 
clause, should the clause still be enforced.138  
The first question required the consideration of pacta sunt servanda on one hand, which the 
CC noted gives effect to freedom and dignity, and on the other hand the right of access to 
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court.  At this point the court again conformed to an empowerment-based definition of 
dignity, by stating that ‘[s]elf-autonomy, or the ability to regulate one's own affairs, even to 
one's own detriment, is the very essence of freedom and a vital part of dignity’.139 This has 
been criticised as it ignores the version of dignity which protects a person from being used as 
a means to an end.140  However the court did go further to say that the extent of the freedom 
and voluntariness is an important factor to determine the weight to be attached to the value of 
dignity and freedom.141 This shows the court’s acknowledgement that the values of dignity 
and freedom may be limited by substantive equality considerations,142 namely the factors that 
have limited the capacity of a party to enter into a contract freely and voluntarily. This is an 
objective enquiry.  
The second question requires a consideration of the factors or circumstances that have 
prevented compliance with the clause. This is a subjective enquiry. This means that even if a 
clause is not contrary to public policy, an insured still has an opportunity to provide a sound 
reason for non-compliance. This is clearly a reference to the bargaining power of the insured 
as an enquiry into the reasons for non-compliance would entail an examination into the 
realities faced by the insured.143 
The CC further explained that although the court in Afrox did not find evidence of unequal 
bargaining power on the facts, the principle that the relative bargaining positions of the 
parties is relevant to the enquiry of whether the term is contrary to public policy must not be 
overlooked.144 This means that the CC acknowledges that in instances of unequal bargaining 
power there may be injustices that need to be brought to light. The fact that the unequal 
bargaining power of a party is a factor to be considered when determining if a contract is 
contrary to public policy was confirmed by the CC, and as the court held, this is a vitally 
important principle especially in ‘a society as unequal as ours’.145  
The question remains, whether the recognition of the limiting effect of equality on freedom 
(thereby including considerations of the realities faced by people and allowing a measure of 
contractual certainty) will continue. The answer, it is submitted, depends on whether the 
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courts will continue on this transformative journey146 to fully realise the content of the values 
of freedom, dignity and equality. 
 
2.6 Jordan v Farber 
In 2009 the case of Jordan v Farber147 was heard in the Northern Cape High Court. The 
applicants, a couple married in community of property, were the co-owners of a farm. 
However they fell ill and could not continue to run the farm. This caused them to fall into 
arrears with instalments on a loan to the Land Development Bank.148 The applicants then 
consulted the respondent, a practising attorney, to handle the Land Bank matter and another 
matter. The respondent informed the applicant that he had made an arrangement with the 
bank and asked them to leave the matter of the farm in his hands.149 The respondent also 
agreed to rent the farm in his personal capacity as well as hire some of the cattle on the farm. 
The respondent and applicant agreed on a rental amount that was to be paid to the bank.150  
The respondent had drawn up all the contracts himself, even though the contracts directly 
involved him in his personal capacity. He abused his position of power as the contracts were 
drawn up in his best interests. When the bank sued the applicant for an escalated amount, it 
became obvious that the respondent had no agreement with the bank to pay off the arrear 
instalments.151 
In determining whether the terms of the contract were contrary to the boni mores the court 
referred to Barkhuizen, namely that a court will not enforce a contract that is contrary to 
public policy, and in determining public policy consideration must be given to the Bill of 
Rights and the founding values of the Constitution.152 
With this in mind as well as reference to Afrox, the court expressly stated that in order to 
determine whether the contract was reasonable and not contrary to public policy, the 
bargaining power of the parties must be considered.153 
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In considering the relative bargaining positions of the parties the court commented on the 
relationship between the respondent and applicant (that of attorney and client). The court 
emphasised that an attorney has a tremendous amount of power over his client as a client 
comes to an attorney for advice in usually stressful circumstances. In other words the client is 
emotionally and often financially vulnerable so they cannot refuse or analyse advice given to 
them by their attorney. The court expressly noted that the respondent was in a much stronger 
bargaining position than the applicant154 and that this was relevant in determining if the 
contract was contrary to public policy.155 
Additionally the court held that the contract was contrary to public policy due to the fact that 
the respondent had breached the standards of professional ethics that governed his 
professional conduct.156 He had entered into an agreement in his personal capacity with his 
clients and did not comply with his duty to inform them to obtain independent legal advice.157 
The court stated that, as he had acted in a manner that was disgraceful, dishonest and unfair 
the contract was contrary to public policy and therefore void. 158 The court was satisfied that 
this was sufficient reason to render the contract contrary to public policy and therefore 
void.159 
However, ‘for the sake of completeness’160 the judge went a step further to explain that even 
if he was wrong to come to such a conclusion, the fact that there was no meeting of the minds 
on the amount of rent to be paid per annum and how large the instalments should be, the 
contract would be void for the reason of a lack of consensus.161 
In this case the court did acknowledge the fact that the applicant had freely and voluntarily 
entered into the agreement, but the court took into consideration the obvious imbalance of 
bargaining power and found this to be a factor to render the contract contrary to public 
policy.162 A further factor the court considered sufficient to render the contract contrary to 
public policy was the fact that the respondent was so grossly in breach of the standard of 
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professional ethics.163  This finding has been commendably described to be in line with the 
cautious SCA and CC approach, namely that: 
Judges should use their power to intervene and declare contracts or contractual terms freely 
entered into void/unenforceable, sparingly, with perceptive restraint and only in the clearest of 
cases in which the impropriety of the transaction and public harm are manifest.164 
The finding was further described as having the effect of illustrating that the principle of 
sanctity of contract does not override consideration of dignity and equality and that contract 
terms that are contrary to the values of dignity and equality will be unconstitutional as they 
would be contrary to public policy.165 
However, it has also been said that the court was too quick to reach for public policy 
considerations to remedy the matter. The fact that the respondent acted in an unethical 
manner by the misrepresentation, and the abuse of his superior position over his client could 
have been argued to have improperly induced the consent given by the client in terms of the 
lease.166 The reason for such a comment is that the contract would have been beneficial to 
both parties had the respondent held up his end of the bargain.167 It was not the contract that 
was contrary to public policy but the manner in which the contract came about that was 
contrary to public policy. This more immediately concerns the consent obtained and whether 
such consent was improperly obtained.  
 
It would appear that the court in this case had placed unnecessary emphasis on public policy 
when it, perhaps, should have more immediately considered the route of improperly obtained 
consensus. It is therefore clear that the instances when specific equity principles should apply 
to a matter is not yet crystallised in South African contract law. Therefore, based on such a 
comment, it is submitted that this case illustrates the need for the law on public policy, good 
faith and improperly obtained consensus to be developed to further a context-sensitive 
approach to contract law. 
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2.7 Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 
The case of Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 
168concerned a 20 year notarial lease agreement, which was entered into by the Uniting 
Reformed Church (hereafter referred to as the church) as lessor and the State169 as the lessee.  
In response to the inadequate educational facilities (in place in terms of apartheid policies) 
available to its members, the Uniting Reformed Church assumed the responsibility to provide 
decent educational facilities for the community.170 This was in terms of its social and spiritual 
obligations and to fulfil these obligations, which included developing new and existing 
neglected school buildings, the church used its own financial resources and acquired loans.171 
The State took over the running of the schools as required by legislation at that time. The 
church was experiencing financial difficulties which resulted in the schools becoming quite 
neglected by the time the State came to the assistance of the church.172 In return for a loan 
facilitated in favour of the church, registered against the security of the buildings mortgage 
bonds, the State required the notarial lease agreement to be signed in respect of the school 
buildings.173 Clause 16 of the contract required the church to transfer the property to the state 
free of charge once 20 years had passed. 
 The notarial lease and the mortgage bond were registered against the title deeds of the 
properties and only then the funds were made available to the State which it used to renovate 
the neglected schools.174 The State paid rent to the church, and the church was responsible for 
the maintenance of the school buildings and for maintaining the insurance for the properties 
as well as for paying the municipal rates and taxes as well as other relevant levies.175 
The issue before the court was whether clause 16 was valid. The church argued that clause 16 
was contrary to public policy firstly because it was in a weaker bargaining position when it 
agreed to the lease, which was weighted heavily against the church. Secondly the church 
claimed that the clause was invalid because it was a violation of section 25 of the 
Constitution, which prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of property. 
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The church stated that it was in a ‘precarious financial situation’176 therefore it entered into 
the lease agreement in order to keep its hold on the immoveable property. The court agreed 
with the applicant that they had no choice but to enter into the contract and ultimately found 
that the clause in question was contrary to public policy and therefore invalid. Zondi J stated: 
The question is whether the applicant has established facts which objectively demonstrate that 
at the time of the conclusion of the lease agreements it was in a weaker bargaining position than 
the Department and that the effect of inequality in bargaining position was harmful to public 
interest. I am satisfied from the applicant's papers that the applicant has succeeded in meeting 
the requisite threshold.177 
This seems to indicate that the court was satisfied that a mere inequality of bargaining power 
existed, and did not look further for an abuse of such inequality. Whether or not the court 
intended the abuse of bargaining power to not be considered, it must be noted that it is 
illogical to expect contracting parties to have equal standing and the courts’ intervention 
should only become relevant when there is an abuse of unequal bargaining power. 
In the court’s determination of whether clause 16 was contrary to public policy and therefore 
unconstitutional, Zondi J first acknowledged (with reference to Sasfin v Beukes178), that the 
interests of the community is of great importance to the consideration of public policy and 
that a contract that offends public policy will not be enforced. However Zondi J did caution 
that the court’s discretion to declare contracts contrary to public policy must be used 
sparingly so as to avoid uncertainty in the law of contract.179 
The judge went further to explain that, according to the case of Napier v Barkhuizen, public 
policy is informed by the founding constitutional values and that contracts must be in line 
with the Constitution.180 The judge acknowledged the principle of pacta sunt servanda181 as 
well as the need for the contract to be in tune with constitutional values of freedom dignity 
and equality.182 
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The judge also acknowledged that the purpose of the courts is not to ‘merely enforce 
contracts’ but to apply a minimum standard of fairness that includes a consideration of the 
relative bargaining powers of the parties. 
In support of the submission that clause 16 was contrary to public policy, the church argued 
that at the time the agreement was entered into the church had no choice but to accept the 
terms of the agreement due to its dire financial situation. 183 The church provided no further 
evidence or argument to illustrate that it was in a weaker bargaining position, or that there 
was abuse of that weaker bargaining position, such that it was contrary to public policy. 
Furthermore the court only considered the bargaining position of the church, without 
considering what may have pressured the hand of the State. Sharrock explains that the court 
did not consider whether the respondent, being a government department, was under pressure 
from its own policy, the law or the government to spend its budget on developing schools.184 
Sharrock is of the opinion that the court ‘glossed over’ several important facts. He explains 
that the court did not consider the economic realities of the situation. The respondent had 
agreed to take over the responsibility of paying for the insurance for the property and had 
undertaken the cost of all of the maintenance and development of the schools and therefore 
there was nothing unusual or disproportionate about ownership being transferred on such 
terms. Additionally the school, in order to achieve its goal of continuing to provide a school 
for the community had knowingly given up its right to ownership to achieve its goals.185 
Sharrock comments that Zondi J’s description of clause 16 as a ‘disguised expropriation’ is 
inaccurate as the respondent did pay for the loan required to develop the school and that both 
parties had actually agreed to the transfer of ownership, regardless of whether the applicant 
had no alternative. 
As concluded by Sharrock, the court’s evaluation of the parties’ relative bargaining power 
was insufficiently analysed.186 
Zondi J stated187: 
In my view the provisions of clause 16 sanction arbitrary deprivation of property and are 
contrary to the provisions of s 25 … there is no sufficient reason to warrant the deprivation of 
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the applicant's properties. To the extent that clause 16 of the lease seeks to deprive the applicant 
of its properties without creating an obligation on the third respondent to pay compensation, it 
is, in my view, unfair and therefore contrary to public policy. 
From this extract it becomes unclear as to whether the contract is contrary to public policy 
because it is contrary to section 25 of the Constitution or because the applicant was in a 
weaker bargaining position. This is because it can be argued that the clause can either be 
unconstitutional because it is a violation of section 25 of the Constitution (which would 
attract an enquiry into whether such a limitation of the right is reasonable and justifiable with 
a consideration of the constitutional values of equality, dignity and freedom) or it is 
unconstitutional because it offends public policy (which as determined by Barkhuizen entails, 
among other factors, a consideration of the bargaining powers of the parties and the 
constitutional values of equity, dignity and freedom). It is respectfully submitted that this 
case illustrates the under-developed manner in which courts enforce equity in South African 
contract law. The apparent lack of distinction between direct and indirect application of the 
Bill of Rights to such a contract is probably a result of the lack of clarity regarding the proper 
approach caused by the CC judgment in Barkhuizen (and the criticism of that case). At least it 
can probably be said that the court’s judgment in Uniting Reformed Church is lacking in 
clarity, and rather vague in its treatment of the legal impact of the parties’ bargaining power 
in the relevant scenario. 
The most obvious problematic aspect of the judgement for present purposes is the possible 
deviation from the fact that bargaining power has been held by the SCA to be only a factor in 
determining whether a contract is contrary to public policy. Surely such a deviation merits a 
clear and well-reasoned explanation, however, as surmised by Sharrock, Zondi J did not 
explain how his conclusions of unequal bargaining power had impacted on the outcome of 
the judgement. Sharrock concludes by stating that this judgement creates uncertainty as to the 
weight to be attached to bargaining power when considering the validity of a contract.188 
Additionally, Sharrock explains that while this judgment does not provide clarity, it does 
throw into sharp focus the need for the weight of unequal bargaining power to be defined in 
contract law, and if such definition is not achieved then the sanctity of contract may well be 
undermined.189 
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The case of Brisley saw the SCA favouring a classical liberal understanding of freedom and 
dignity, to the exclusion of substantive equality considerations, even though the realities 
faced by the parties could arguably show a great discrepancy of bargaining power. A similar 
favouring of a classical liberal understanding of freedom of contract was shown in Afrox, 
however the SCA had taken a small transformative step by acknowledging that the 
bargaining power of a party was a factor relevant in determining whether the contract was 
contrary to public policy. This principle was subsequently relied upon by the SCA and later 
the CC in the case of Barkhuizen. The case of Barkhuizen furthered the transformation by 
including a context-sensitive step in its test for determining whether a term of a contract ran 
afoul of public policy, thereby rendering it unconstitutional. Evidently, upon an examination 
of the above cases, a clear trend does emerge, namely that the bargaining power of the parties 
to a contract is slowly being accepted in a determination of whether or not a contract meets 
the standards of public policy and ultimately the Constitution. This entails a larger role to be 
played by substantive equality, as a more appropriate consideration of bargaining power 
results in the realities faced by contracting parties being more appropriately considered by the 
courts.  
Although the best way to approach a consideration of the fact of unequal bargaining power is 
still in the process of being defined, and there is still some uncertainty, as evidenced in the 
judgments of some lower courts, as to the correct manner of dealing with unequal bargaining 
power. In Jordan, the fact that the court decided to consider the yardstick of public policy 
(and within that, bargaining power) rather than whether the consensus was improperly 
obtained shows that the court has, perhaps, ignored a more appropriate route to remedy the 
matter. This is, however, not to say that the court was incorrect in its decision, rather that the 
concepts of public policy, good faith and improperly obtained consensus should be developed 
according to the renewed interest in developing a context- sensitive approach to substantive 
fairness in contract law. The Uniting Reformed Church case does not provide firm ground 
from which to develop the future of unequal bargaining power, as the court appears to have 
found the mere existence of unequal bargaining power sufficient to invalidate a contract, 
which is out of step with the approach of the SCA (which prefers to use the evidence of 
unequal bargaining power along with other factors when determining the validity of a 
contract).  It is also out of step with logic, in respect of its focus on the reality of parties’ 





However there is no clear definition as to whether the bargaining power of the parties should 
be a mere factor to consider when determining the validity of a contract or not. What is clear 
is that there is a need for the realisation of substantive equality in contract law190 and the 
manner in which the courts deal with bargaining power in the future will be relevant to the 
realisation of substantive equality. The concepts of good faith and unequal bargaining power 
are now considered under the test for public policy, as established in Barkhuizen. However 
there is a pervasive presence of a classical liberal understanding of values, which are now 
imbibed with constitutional status as foundational values which underlie the Bill of Rights 
that is slowly being eroded. Brand is of the view that the manner in which the SCA has dealt 
with reasonableness, fairness and good faith is appropriate, and not in conflict with 
constitutional values.191 However, he does clarify that the bargaining power of a party should 
be of some concern to the courts and that the overarching concept of public policy is still in 
need of some development,192 which he explains is achievable without causing legal and 
commercial uncertainty, given the ability of our law to adapt to ‘changing needs and values 
of society’. It is therefore submitted that it is apparent that the needs and values of society 
have changed, and demand a context-sensitive or substantive approach to equality in contract 
law rather than the formalistic approach previously adopted by the courts. Contract law needs 
to be further developed in regard to the weight to be attached to the presence of unequal 
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3. THE FACTORS THAT LIMIT BARGAINING POWER 
3.1 Introduction 
Consumer law and labour law were once aspects of society fraught with oppression and 
injustice. Now legislation has been promulgated that governs specifically theses aspects of 
society and commercial dealings and as a result these injustices have been greatly limited and 
a healthier environment for these contractual parties is slowly forming. However by only 
addressing these obvious injustices, such legislation is only treating the symptoms without 
providing relief from the source. Based on the discussions in chapters 2 and 3 above the 
culture and attitude surrounding the formation, enforcement and dispute resolution of 
contractual matters leaves much to be desired. It is clear that a baseline comprising of morals, 
fairness, dignity, good faith and a standard of treating people with respect, needs to be 
instilled.  
The need for an infusion of such morals into the law is encapsulated in the concept of Ubuntu 
and the concept of good faith. The court in Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite 
Checkers (Pty) Ltd193 emphasised that contracts are entered into on a daily basis, and with 
every contract comes the potential for a party to not act in good faith. The court further 
emphasised the desirability of infusing contract law with constitutional values, like 
Ubuntu.194 The value of Ubuntu would throw light on the fact that we all live in a community 
and therefore the manner in which we treat one another is of vital relevance to building a 
better south Africa that practices 'humaneness, social justice and fairness’ as well as 'the key 
values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms 
and collective unity'.195 
 
The Constitution seeks to infuse the law with values of freedom, dignity and equality. 
Although these values have not yet been fully realised in contract law, they would appear to 
demand this baseline of morals in every transaction. Barnard-Naude likens these 
constitutional aspirations to an ideal of a ‘civic friendship’.196 Civic friendship is an ideal not 
that different from Ubuntu, as they both are defined by the common denominator of dignity. 
Civic friendship provides that a person is able to define their self-worth or dignity because 
they live in a community that has acknowledged and respected their dignity. In this way both 
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Ubuntu and a civic friendship centre on the interdependence of the members of a community 
and the respect that we each should have for one another. This respect should exist not 
necessarily because we like or admire every other person, but simply because they form part 
of our human community. 
 
It is clear that the Constitution envisions the law of South Africa to be embedded with values 
that demand an unconditionally respectful and moral standard of behaviour. Such values 
require that when parties contract, it is done ‘with respect for and consideration of the other 
party’.197 However those ideals are yet to be fully realised as there are many factors that limit 
the free negotiation of contracts and the relative abilities of contracting parting to achieve the 
realisation of such values. 
 
3.2 Factors that Limit a Party’s Bargaining Power. 
In an article considering the limits of judicial control in terms of the problematic issues that 
often face consumers who enter into contracts, Naude provides a comprehensive 
understanding of the many reasons why intervention is required in contract law. She explores 
the problems arising from non-negotiated contract terms as well as the implications rippling 
from such contract terms.198Although this article was written before the promulgation of the 
Consumer Protection Act,199 the author succinctly analysed the need for intervention as well 
as factors that inhibit a party’s ability to bargain on the terms of the contract.  
Additionally, there are some contracts that fall outside the protection provided by the 
Consumer Protection Act,200yet they are subject to the same potential problems which the Act 
was intended to address, therefore parties to these contracts are uniquely vulnerable. These 
contracts are governed by the common law and judicial control. Although Naude states that 
judicial control is ineffective,201 This study argues differently further on in this study. 
Naude surmises that the main problem regarding non-negotiated contract terms is that the 
resulting contract does not express the actual will of the contracting parties.202 The author 
quotes Zimmermann, expressing that a ‘proper evaluation and balancing of the consequences 
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of the transaction does not normally occur’ for one of the parties to the contract. This is 
usually the party in the weaker bargaining position. 203 
The usual justification for upholding such contract, according to the classical liberal theory, is 
that everyone has the freedom to contract as they wish, therefore under this illusion of 
contractual autonomy a contract is seen to express the will of both parties. However given 
that these contract seldom express the actual will of both parties, this version of contractual 
autonomy is quite logically surmised by Naude to be formalistic, hollow and meaningless.204 
Naude explains that this situation is in desperate need of legislative intervention. However, as 
this study explains, legislative change is the only possible answer as the courts are well 
equipped to effect the desired change. In order for any intervention or change to be effected, a 
proper understanding of the causes of the impaired contractual autonomy of a party is 
essential. The rest of this section will explore these causes as contemplated by Naude. It must 
also be noted that although the article by Naude is primarily concerned with consumers, the 
problems highlighted are consistent with the problems faced by those contracting parties who 
fall outside the definition of a consumer but are still in a weaker bargaining position. For the 
purposes of this section the word consumer must be understood to include the party in a 
weaker bargaining position. 
 
3.2.1 Time, effort and cost 
When we are presented with a contract to sign, it is safe to say that such a document is nearly 
always characterised by lengthy small print script that extends over several pages and, 
although a few clauses are made bold and outlined, the document still appears intimidating. 
Even for a ‘relatively well informed and sophisticated consumer in a competitive market’ 
such a contract would take a substantial amount of time and effort to read and fully 
understand.205Judge Sachs explains, in terms of standard form contracts, that it is irrelevant 
that the consumer is well educated and rich. Standard form terms are often one sided and 
couched in complex legalese such that any consumer is likely to be unaware of its effect and 
even sometimes, its existence.206 In fact Barnhizer is of the opinion that middle class 
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consumers and small businesses are the most obvious victims of an undefined doctrine of 
inequality.207 
Furthermore, should the person fully understand the contract and work out the implications of 
each term, they are faced with another daunting task of finding and contacting a person in the 
counterparty organisation who is able to alter the terms of the agreement if there is a 
perceived need to negotiate terms. Even if such a person is found, with their superior product 
knowledge and with the might of their organisation behind them a single consumer is 
unlikely to expend considerable time and effort on bargaining on the terms of the contract, so 
much so that the consumer may simply surrender without attempting to bargain and accept 
the terms as they are. The costs of spending that much time and effort far outweigh the 
concern experienced by the consumer regarding the terms of the contract.208 This point is 
further supported by Sachs J, who explains in terms of insurance policies, that it would be 
impractical for the ordinary consumer to seek legal advice and shop around for the best 
insurance policy, as the cost of ensuring they get the best deal will outweigh any premium 
they would eventually have to pay. 209 
As a consumer is faced with the same problem with every contract they enter into, a 
reasonable consumer is unlikely to care to fully read any contract, let alone shop around for a 
better deal.210 
 
3.2.2 Psychological factors 
There are many psychological factors at play when a person enters into a contract, which 
cannot be ignored when considering the imbalance of power between contracting parties. 
When a person is confronted with a contract, especially a standard form contract, given the 
length, complexity and characteristic legalese which the contract is drafted in, it would seem ‘ 
official and invariable’, such that a consumer would not even contemplate bargaining on the 
terms of the contract. These contracts are drafted in advance, and in favour of the business, 
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nearly always on a take-it-or-leave-it-basis, which further limits a consumer from bargaining 
on the terms of the contract.211 
Furthermore, the manner in which the person is alerted to the deal sets the tone for the 
manner in which the contract is concluded. For example, advertising plays a large role in the 
frame of mind a consumer has when contracting. Many advertisements give the impression 
that dealing with the company will be a pleasurable and positive experience, and by doing so 
consumers are ‘lulled into a false sense of security, so they feel as if they will be treated 
according to a standard of fair dealing’. 
In a recent study on the effect of advertising on the sales of quick small loans conducted by 
Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, it was established that a vast amount of money is 
spent on creative advertising measures aimed at persuading consumers. The study found that 
advertising that elicits ‘an intuitive, or quick, effortless response’ is more effective opposed 
to advertising content that provokes ‘a deliberative, or conscious, reasoned response’.212 This 
shows that advertising plays on the emotions of a person as people respond to pictures and 
the feelings those pictures elicit.  
Additionally, the environment in which a contract is signed has a psychological influence on 
the consumer. Contracts dealing with cars, cell phones, and even houses are often signed in a 
busy office or shop, where a consumer is surrounded by other shoppers and shop staff. A 
contract usually materialises towards the end of a meeting between a business and a 
consumer. At this point the sales person has already made a convincing pitch, or in other 
circumstances a consumer is already ‘sold’ on the product and the core terms of the contract 
which have been explained to the consumer. Additionally a consumer may have made plans 
that cannot be changed because of a term in a contract that they do not agree with. This is 
another factor that limits the consumer from bargaining on the terms of a contract.213 
Another example of such a situation, would be the instance where a person books a holiday in 
another country via email. After the family has spent a considerable amount of money 
preparing for the holiday, perhaps taken days off from work, traveling a great distance , only 
to find the hotel he has booked to be far below their expectations. It is not practical for him to 
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sign an agreement exempting the hotel from liability for the duration of the family’s stay, so 
more often than not such agreements are simply signed without another thought. 
Furthermore, It is not difficult to imagine that any person, even those with a law degree, do 
not wish to come across, as Naude accurately describes it, as an eccentric, difficult person 
who insists on reading and understanding each clause and its implications while an often 
impatient sales person looks on.214 That said, it is important to note that this is how the 
businesses that fuel our economy are run, however what cannot be simply accepted is the 
environment in which a contract is signed.  There is no culture that exists which encourages a 
person to understand the contract they are signing or a company to take the time to explain it 
to them. It is this unhealthy culture that leaves consumers vulnerable and in a weak if not 
non-existent bargaining position. 
 
3.2.3 Competition 
The market is competitive in nature, as each provider strives to provide a better deal in an 
attempt to make more sales. Although this can be beneficial to a consumer, a competitive 
market has a dark side. Naude explains that businesses, while trying to lower prices, will shift 
more of the risk, hidden in the fine print, on to the unwitting consumer.215 This results in 
contracts that weigh more heavily against the consumer. 
This unsettling fact coupled with the fact that there are many providers offering the same 
product, with equally if not more complex contractual terms, clearly does not inspire 
consumers to shop around for a better deal. In fact, facing such circumstances, often 
consumer don’t attempt to shop around and they merely accept the terms of the contract.216 
This is another factor inhibiting a consumer’s power to bargain on the terms of the contract. 
Such reasoning applies even when the contract is not between a consumer and a business. 
Consider the situation where Person A buys a car from Person B. Person A may not have as 
much knowledge about cars and there are many people selling different cars, in different 
degrees of road worthiness, so Person A is unlikely to shop around, may be under pressure to 
get a car, perhaps to get to work. Person B who knows Person A’s vulnerable position 
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decides to take advantage of the situation, and does not act with good faith because he wants 
to quickly sell the car and get it off his hands for quick cash.  
In other words the mere fact that Person A wanted that particular car from Person B, 
immediately placed Person A in a weaker bargaining position. It is accepted that there is 
usually an imbalance of power between contracting parties, however that must not detract 
from the chance of an abuse of the weaker party. This is why all contracts must be 
approached with a consideration of the circumstances in which the contract came about. 
 
3.2.4 Education 
A survey to assess the knowledge and understanding of financial systems in South Africa, 
commissioned by the Financial Services Board, revealed that 54% of South Africans are 
financially literate.217This means that 46% of South Africans are unable to fully understand 
their finances and therefore cannot make informed decisions about managing their money.218 
A shocking 50% of South Africans are not able to cover their expenses each month, and 56% 
revealed that they borrow food and money from family and friends to get through the month. 
When asked if they had certain savings or investment products 55% admitted that they do 
not, even though they were aware of such opportunities.219 
It becomes glaringly obvious that many South Africans do not have enough financial savvy to 
ensure they stay well out of the red. This inevitably creates a breeding ground for 
unnecessary spending and poor planning for emergencies and unforeseen financial liabilities. 




After considering the many factors that limit the bargaining power of a party, what becomes 
evident is that there is clearly a vulnerable group within society. Any business run on 
capitalist ideals looking to increase sales, as well as any person looking to make money in a 
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capitalistic economy would take every advantage possible to achieve their goals. Naude 
surmises that those who use standard term contracts often bank on such factors as mentioned 
above to hasten the consumer to sign the contract and agree to its terms.220 These same 
factors would also be relied on by those not using standard terms contracts, in other words 
those looking to bind a party to an agreement not necessarily in their favour, in for example 
verbal agreements and even written contracts. Such opportunistic, unscrupulous and 
unprincipled individuals and businesses have harnessed the limited bargaining power of 
certain individuals to maximise their own interests. 
Furthermore, Barnhizer points out that small businesses, their vendors and customers suffer 
as much if not more as typically vulnerable groups, such as the poor or uneducated. It is clear 
that given the important role of small businesses in the economy it is of vital importance for 
the status of inequality of bargaining power to be defined.221  
In all fairness, users of standard form contracts cannot be painted as the devil incarnate 
because standard form contracts do form a vital component of the economy. Standard form 
contracts are a simple and quick means of carrying out a business transaction when dealing 
with complex products and complex organisational structures. Standard form contracts also 
limit legal and managerial costs by allowing a sales person, who is significantly less costly, to 
conduct the transaction.222 This way people are able to buy and sell much more quickly, 
thereby fuelling our economy. Such standard form contracts are justified only because it is in 
the public’s interests that the economy continues to thrive.223 
Naude suggests that only those terms that are in the public interest should be enforced and 
those terms that are weighted unjustifiably against the consumer should not be enforced. In 
support of such a submission, reference is made to Rakoff’s reasoning that businesses should 
prove that non-core terms, or ‘invisible terms’ and that are a deviation from the background 
law must be proved to be fair and reasonable and that the terms are ultimately contributing to 
the maintenance of civic freedom.224 
When contractual disputes arise parties often end up in court hoping for just remediation. 
However after considering that in terms of a classical liberal theory of contract law which 
prefers the value of freedom of contract, it is submitted that these realities that consumers 
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face when signing a contract should be considered because these realties limit the exercise of 
a person’s freedom. In other words, although a person has the freedom to contract, their 
freedom must be considered in the context of the realities of certain limiting factors that are at 
play. 
However as discussed in chapter 2, the value of equality, or the realisation of substantive 
equality has been side-lined in South African contract law. The following two chapters of this 
study will delve into two possible mechanisms that may be used to more appropriately 
address the realities faced by contracting parties, or their relative bargaining power, in order 
for it to be considered more fully as a factor that may affect the validity of a contract, thus 





















4. THE ROLE OF GOOD FAITH IN FULLY REALISING THE FACTOR OF UNEQUAL 
BARGAINING POWER  
 
4.1 Introduction 
In an article proposing a more robust good faith doctrine, Louw begins by explaining the 
current CC-approved definition of good faith. 225 With reference to Brand J, Louw explains 
that the parameters of good faith fall far beyond simple concepts of honesty and the absence 
of bad faith; rather good faith includes more objective concepts  namely ‘justice, 
reasonableness fairness and equity’.226 
To provide a more comprehensive understanding of the concept of good faith, Louw refers to 
Hutchinson, whose view is that good faith can be described as ‘an ethical value or controlling 
principle based on community standards of decency and fairness that underlies and informs 
the substantive law of contract’. Hutchinson goes further to clarify that the manner in which 
good faith is present in the law, is that it provides the moral and theoretical foundation of 
technical rules and doctrines, therefore its function is to legitimise or substantiate the law and 
explain the concept of the particular rule or doctrine concerned. 
It can safely be concluded that when a definition of good faith is attempted, words like 
morals, values, principles, honesty, justice, reasonableness, equity, fairness, decency, and 
community standards are inevitably used to comprehensively shape the concept of good 
faith.227 When one considers an instance of abuse of superior bargaining power, a concept 
such as good faith, encompassing all these notions, seemingly presents a solid path to justice. 
However, as established in our law the concept of good faith is an abstract value that cannot 
be independently and directly applied to a matter.228 
This is unfortunate; if good faith were applied directly, instances of the abuse of superior 
bargaining power would not be tolerated as contract law would demand a standard of honesty 
and respect between contracting parties. As discussed above, it is impractical to expect the 
parties to contract on equal standing. There will always (or usually) be an imbalance of 
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bargaining power. The concept of good faith becomes pertinent when there is an abuse of 
unequal bargaining power. The reasoning is that a version of contract law that demands 
honesty and respect for one another would not allow an abuse of superior power. Good faith 
speaks to the very essence of the contractual interaction which supports the submission that 
substantive equality must be realised in each and every contract. It is submitted that through 
the development of a concept of good faith, the abuses that may result from a situation of 
unequal bargaining power will be more effectively dealt with. Such a thought immediately 
raises the question of whether or not good faith should hold a more robust position in contract 
law. It is submitted that good faith is flexible enough to deal with modern day contracts, 
while the rigid, formalistic principles of contract law are falling short of justice as envisioned 
in the Constitution.229 
This section will firstly explore the current role of good faith and subsequently its prospects 
of playing a more effective role in contract law. This study will then consider the question of 
whether instances of superior bargaining power will be dealt with in an entirely different 
manner than it is at present, if good faith were to be given a more prominent role by our 
courts. 
 
4.2 The Current Role of Good Faith 
The current role of the principle of good faith as well as the Constitutional and SCA’s caution 
regarding the application of good faith cannot be explored without considering how the 
principle has been treated in the past. 
The principle of good faith can be traced back to Roman law. In light of certain procedures 
and remedies available, Roman law differentiated between contracts negotia stricti iuris and 
negotia bonae fide. As succinctly summarised by Barnard-Naude, the enforceability of a 
negotia bonae fide depended directly on every aspect of the contract being in line with the 
bonae fides.230 On the other hand negotia stricti iuris required the parties (except if the 
contract expressed a requirement to adhere to the bonae fides) to strictly adhere to the terms 
agreed upon regardless of what would be considered appropriate by the bona fides.  A 
defence of bad faith231, the exceptio doli generalis, was introduced to eradicate any injustices 
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that may occur due to such a strict enforcement of contracts. However the need for an 
exceptio doli generalis defence fell away in Roman Dutch law as all contracts were required 
to be negotia bonae fide.232 In other words, contracts were required to be in good faith. 
Barnard-Naude, with reference to Aronstam, argues that because all contracts were required 
to be in line with the bona fide, and the bona fides would require contracts to be made in 
good faith, then the bad faith defence, or exceptio doli generalis would still be needed and 
therefore it had survived the transition from Roman law to Roman Dutch law.233 
Unfortunately, the exceptio doli generalis was stopped in its tracks by the judgment of Bank 
of Lisbon and South Africa v De Ornelas and Others234, which held that the exceptio doli 
generalis did not make its way into Roman Dutch law let alone South African law; in 
addition it was held that this defence was unnecessary, obsolete and its use should be 
prohibited. Barnard-Naude surmises that this judgement had initially disallowed a contract to 
be struck down on the basis of good faith and, in agreement with Cockrell235, he argues that 
this rejection of good faith determining the enforceability of a contract stems from ‘an 
extreme form of individualism’. 
Individualism proposes that the world comprises of individuals who always act in their own 
self-interest, but such that they can still co-exist with other individuals. During the 18th 
century contracts were measured against values of fairness and good faith, and this meant that 
contracts were not enforced fastidiously as the growing commercial class would like.236 The 
Bank of Lisbon case marked a watershed in our law concerning good faith as the judicial 
marginalisation of these values, in determining the enforceability of a contract, had begun by 
setting freedom of contract and the principle of good faith on opposite sides of the battlefield.  
To further illustrate this point, the case of Sasfin v Beukes237, which was decided a few 
months after the Bank of Lisbon case, will be considered. The court in Sasfin was faced with 
a deed of cession of a bank customer’s earnings to the bank, such that the bank customer 
could end up ceding his entire salary. Beukes was at the mercy of the bank and the court 
found that due to the extreme unreasonableness of the cession, the whole contract was 
unenforceable as it ran contrary to public policy. 
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Although it seems like progression towards toppling freedom of contract from its perch, in 
that the court reasoned that the strict adherence to the agreed terms of a contract may be 
overridden by other relevant factors, such as public policy, the court in fact issued a warning 
that has served to limit future development of the application of good faith in determining the 
enforceability of a contract. The court warned that the ability of a court to declare a contract 
contrary to public policy, and therefore unenforceable, must be used ‘sparingly and only in 
the clearest of cases’238. This means that the courts’ ability to use equity considerations alone 
in determining the enforceability of a contract is limited, and ultimately this allows 
commercial interests in strict adherence to agreed terms to prevail, almost unscathed. This 
can be described as perpetuating the formalistic nature of contract law, as this innovation was 
treated with scepticism.239 
Brand highlights Parliament’s reluctance to allow equity considerations to possibly strike out 
a contract, by referring to the South African Law Reform Commission’s proposed draft bill 
on unfair contracts and contract terms, which recommended that courts should be allowed to 
strike out a contract that is found to be unreasonable, unconscionable or oppressive240. This 
rejection by Parliament further bolsters Barnard-Naude’s proposition on the hegemonic 
nature of the law of contract as evident in the role played by the principle of sanctity of 
contract. It can be said, the fact that the proposed bill is viewed with such opposition is 
illustrative of the dominant commercial class seeking to legitimise its interests by making it 
the interests of the working class. The dominant class does so by legitimising its interests by 
rationalising that the legal and commercial uncertainty that would result would be 
disastrous.241 
Olivier JA, who acted as project leader of the sub-committee of the Law Reform 
Commission, valiantly swum against the tide of such developments in favour of a more 
conservative role for substantive equity in his minority judgement in Eerste Nasionale Bank 
van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman.242 In this case an elderly lady had signed as surety for 
her son. Sometime later she was declared unable to manage her own affairs. Her daughter 
applied for the suretyship to be set aside. The court did not decide the case using the principle 
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of good faith but ultimately did find that the contract was unenforceable as the elderly lady 
lacked contractual capacity at the time she signed the deed. 
 
Judge Olivier’s minority judgement, described as notorious243, reasoned that in the Saayman 
case, considering the nature and circumstances that surrounded the contract, if the court did 
enforce the terms of the contract, this would run contrary to principles of good faith, bona 
fides and equity. In Olivier J’s view this was sufficient to entitle the court to refuse the 
enforcement of the contract. The reason for his support for allowing a court to strike down a 
contract found to be contrary to good faith, was that although the exceptio doli generalis is no 
longer relevant in our law, this does not mean considerations of good faith are no longer a 
part of our law because it is still expected in terms of iudicia bonae fide, which was 
successfully assimilated into South African contract law from Roman Dutch law. 244 Justice 
Olivier’s minority judgement led to a bout of legal uncertainty245, until the case of Brisley v 
Drotsky246 which held that all the cases decided in reliance on Olivier J’s minority in 
Saayman were decided incorrectly247 
 
The court in Brisley disagreed with the lessee and explained that the minority judgement in 
Saayman was characterised by a value judgement of one judge, with whom the other four 
judges on the bench in that case disagreed that such principles, if contravened, are sufficient 
for a court to interfere in contractual relations of private parties. The court warned that when 
judges use their own moral compass to determine if a contractual provision should be 
enforced or not, there is a real danger of legal and commercial uncertainty. If the law was 
made by a value judgement in each case, the boundaries of what is right and wrong would 
change with every case and no one would know with accuracy, where those boundaries lie. It 
goes without saying that this would undesirably and inevitably lead to unnecessary litigation. 
The court also explained that principles of good faith, boni mores and fairness are not 
independent, substantive rules that can be directly applied by courts, rather they are abstract 
values that ‘perform creative, informative and controlling functions through established rules 
of contract law’248. This judgement is clearly formalistic in nature as concepts of fairness, 
reasonableness and good faith are not considered to be important considerations and the idea 
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of a call for judicial discretion is rejected outright. 249 Such formalistic application of the 
principles of contract cannot possibly aid in transforming contract law to better realise the 
value of equality which underlies the Constitution.  
 
This ideal was perpetuated in the case of Barkhuizen v Napier250 where the court held that the 
proper approach to determine constitutional challenges to contractual terms is to ascertain 
whether the term challenged is contrary to public policy as evidenced by the constitutional 
values, in particular, those found in the Bill of Rights.251 
 
Regarding the concept of good faith the court made reference to the case of Tuckers Land and 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis252and the court did deduce that our law of 
contract law is impliedly subject to the bona fides253 or legal convictions of the community. 
However the court also acknowledged the warning made by the Appellate division that the 
community’s idea of what makes up the bona fides, is subject to change.  
  
In the more recent case of Potgieter v Potgieter254 the court disagreed with the court a quo’s 
interpretation of Ngcobo J’s judgment in Barkhuizen. The court a quo had incorrectly held 
that Ngcobo J’s judgment now allowed courts to strike down clauses it found to be 
unreasonable, unfair and unjust, and were therefore contrary to public policy. However what 
Ngcobo J actually meant was that contracts or contract terms that were limiting a right of 
general application were to be subjected to a fairness and reasonableness enquiry. In this case 
however the clause in question did not attract such an enquiry.  
 
The court in Potgieter ultimately held that until the CC holds otherwise, the courts cannot 
refuse to enforce a contract which it considered to be unfair or unreasonable.255 The court 
added that  by allowing a court to decide a case based on what it considered to be fair and 
reasonable would lead to ‘ intolerable legal uncertainty’ as the criterion for reasonableness 
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and fairness will not be the law, it will be the preferences of the relevant judge.256 It is clear 
that the courts are adamant that good faith is an abstract, ethical value that can only play a 
controlling, informative and creative function and cannot be applied directly in contract law 
at present. The approach taken by the court in Potgieter has been described as ‘inaccurate, 
overly conservative and constitutionally unsound’.257 
After reaching such a conclusion, as the court did in Potgieter, it seems counterproductive to 
attach the hope of the abuse of unequal bargaining power being adequately realised, to the 
concept of good faith. However it is submitted that the concept of good faith in contract law 
is yet to reach its zenith, and such a statement finds substance from the following analysis of 
recent cases and academic commentary. 
 
4.3 The Prospects of Good Faith Playing a More Robust Role 
Barnard-Naude proposes that the law at present supports a version of freedom of contract 
which champions commercial interests in its strict adherence to agreed contract terms. This is 
what he calls the hegemonic nature of the law. To break this hegemonic nature of the law 
Barnard-Naude proposes that the working class must realise that they have accepted the 
values of the commercial class to be legitimate.258 It is submitted that with a normative 
approach, that better realises the value of substantive equality, the realities of the middle, 
working class can be properly considered in terms of contract law.  
 
In a critical examination of the SCA and CC judgements of the well-known Barkhuizen case 
Barnard-Naude chalks up the judgements as one that furthers commercial interests, by 
supporting a strict adherence to agreed contract terms. His argument is relevant in 
considering the future role of good faith as it traces the uncovering of legal reasoning, which 
protects commercial interests, so that the value of good faith can be properly considered. 
 
In the SCA judgment of Barkhuizen, in which Cameron J emphasised, as he did in Brisley, 
that the Constitution does not allow a judge to render a contract unenforceable based on 
‘imprecise notions of good faith’ and that notions that are enshrined in the founding values of 
the Constitution, such as public policy, non-sexism, non-racialism, human dignity, equality 
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among others are the proper way for a judge to invalidate an agreement.259 Barnard-Naude 
criticises the SCA for rejecting good faith for being too imprecise a notion while accepting 
the arguably equally imprecise notions of public policy, human dignity, non-racialism, non-
sexism and equality. He asserts that all these notions call for the courts to interpret and justify 
these notions such that they can be realised, and dismissing good faith in this manner is 
‘arbitrary and incoherent’. 260  Clearly Barnard-Naude proposes that the working class is 
persuaded to believe that good faith has no possibility of being directly applied by a judge 
because of its inherent imprecision. This is the belief that needs to be overturned in order to 
break the hegemonic nature of contract law. 
 
In his most compelling illustration of the fact that the courts support a version of freedom of 
contract (which champions commercial interests in strict adherence to agreed contract terms) 
he draws a comparison between the judgments of Davis J in the case of Mort NO v Henry 
Shield-Chiat261 and the CC’s majority judgement in Barkhuizen. This comparison raises the 
question of whether the consideration of good faith is a part of a consideration of public 
policy. The CC in Barkhuizen held that if a contract is proven to be contrary to public policy 
it will be unenforceable, and that public policy represents the values of the legal convictions 
of the community and imports notions of fairness, justice and reasonableness.262 This means 
that the enforceability of a contract can be determined by the legal convictions of the 
community. Barnard-Naude then points out that Davis J describes the legal convictions of the 
community in terms of good faith, so both Davis J and the CC agree that the enforceability of 
a contract is determined by the legal convictions of the community. In the words of Barnard-
Naude, ‘[t]he only disagreement between the CC and Davis J is the doctrinal name of these 
legal convictions’.263   
 
The court in Barkhuizen did include good faith in the second leg of its test to determine if the 
terms of the contract are contrary to public policy. It is apparent that the court views good 
faith as a further filter to prevent enforcement of a contract term that is unfair or unjust.264 
The court held that had reasons for non-compliance been provided only then the court would 
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have been able to apply the principle of good faith.265 It is submitted that through the lens of 
good faith, the true impact of the unequal bargaining power of parties will be realised. It is 
apparent that reasons for non-compliance, or the relative bargaining positions of the insured 
would have been measures against the yardstick of the principle of good faith.266 
 
However, Ngcobo J states that ‘While there is a compelling argument for the proposition that 
both the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia and the requirement of good faith should be 
applicable to the enforcement of time-limitation clauses, the applicability of these common-
law principles will depend on the reason advanced for non-compliance’267 and as the reasons 
for non-compliance with the time limitation clause were rather sketchy in this case, the court 
could not determine if the clause was unfair and therefore contrary to public policy. Although 
the CC could not decide on the role of good faith on the facts before it, it must be noted that 
this comment by Ngcobo J is illustrative of the transformative steps forward a court is duty 
bound to take as the court provided that the principle of good faith is given effect by the 
common law rule that ‘contractual clauses that are impossible to comply with should not be 
enforced’.268 It can be concluded that but-for the reasons for non-compliance the court would 
have considered good faith in its determination of whether the contract is fair and ultimately 
in line with public policy. 269 The CC has left us with the possibility that good faith may play 
a larger role as part of a public policy enquiry. 
 
The CC addressed the issue of the role of good faith more directly in the case of Everfresh 
Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 270  and stressed the importance of 
defining the extent of the good faith requirement in contract law.271 Yacoob J describes good 
faith as an ‘important moral denominator’ in terms of contract law272 that is in line with the 
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spirit purport and objects of the Constitution. It is clear and logical that good faith is at the 
basis of every contractual relationship because without the moral obligation to carry out 
every promise made the practice of entering into a contract will become hollow and 
meaningless. This case, whilst concerning the role of good faith in the more specific context 
of a so-called ‘agreement to agree’, may hold important implications for good faith in 
contracts, more generally. 
 
Yacoob J, in his minority judgement, held that a strict application of agreed upon contract 
terms is too narrow:273 
 
The question whether the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution require courts to 
encourage good faith in contractual dealings and whether our Constitution insists that good 
faith requirements are enforceable should be determined sooner rather than later. Many people 
enter into contracts daily and every contract has the potential not to be performed in good faith. 
The issue of good faith in contract touches the lives of many ordinary people in our country. 
The values embraced by an appropriate appreciation of Ubuntu are also relevant in the process 
of determining the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution.274 
 
From this dictum we see that the importance of good faith must not be underestimated, as 
contracts are a vital part of everyday life and because contracts play such an integral part of 
everyday life, it follows that the part played by contracts must limit conflicts between 
contracting parties by importing requirements of good faith, freedom, dignity and equality on 
contracting parties. The CC is slowly attributing more appreciation of the potential role of 
good faith in contract law and that good faith is in fact embedded in the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Constitution, which irresistibly can be likened to principles of Ubuntu which 
further illustrate a need for recognition of a good faith requirement in contract law.  
 
Yacoob J also held that Everfresh would have been successful in its mission to develop the 
common law such that it is infused with the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution, 
including good faith, and that just because the High court did not consider s 39(2) when it 
should have, in his opinion Everfresh should not be denied the appeal.275  
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Moseneke J, in his majority judgement in this case, expressed his support for the common 
law being imbued with constitutional values, as well as values of Ubuntu.276 He concisely and 
eloquently expressed the following explanation of Ubuntu, which is not hard to reconcile 
with the spirit of good faith:  
 
It [Ubuntu] emphasises the communal nature of society and 'carries in it the ideas of 
humaneness, social justice and fairness’ and envelopes 'the key values of group solidarity, 
compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective unity' 
 
Unfortunately the CC felt that the much needed call for the common law to be developed 
such that it can be infused with constitutional values such as good faith and Ubuntu could not 
be heard for the first and last time at the CC, and Everfresh’s challenge was thus dismissed on 
such technical ground. 
 
However, it can still be distilled from this judgement that the CC has moved away from 
labelling good faith as a danger to legal and commercial uncertainty and is willing to nurture 
it such that it can be assimilated into contract law more effectively. It is also important to note 
that by binding good faith to the comprehensive notion of Ubuntu the court in Everfresh has 
given new depth to the concept of good faith, which, in my opinion, sets good faith well on 
its way to carving a niche for itself in contract law. Ubuntu has the potential to guide the 
notion of good faith towards governing the relationship between parties and the manner in 
which an agreement is struck. These sentiments are also expressed by Louw: 
 
Everfresh now stands as a clear indication that, firstly, the CC is prepared to tackle the proper 
role of good faith in contracts (especially under the value system of ubuntu) and, secondly, that 
the court appears to be of the opinion that the current role of good faith as expressed so 
consistently by the SCA in the cases referred to earlier probably needs to be revisited in favour 
of a more robust role for this principle than has hitherto been recognised.277 
 
Barnard-Naude is also of the opinion that good faith, when considered with Ubuntu, should 
be apparent in the way we as a community interact with one another, and he declares as 
follows: 
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[T]he Constitution aspires to an ideal of civic friendship (a ‘politics’ of friendship if you will) 
which requires, mandates and demands negotiation (contracting) otherwise — that is, with 
respect for and consideration of the other contracting party. I believe that the Constitution 
aspires to the post-liberal ideal of civic friendship precisely because of its foundational 
injunction to respect the dignity of all others.278 
 
After considering the judgement in Everfresh, in which the Constitution stressed the 
importance of reaching a conclusion on the role of good faith and that the concept of Ubuntu 
further bolsters a good faith argument and that these concepts are required to be considered 
appropriately to develop the common law in line with the spirit purport and object of the 
Constitution, it would seem that this is the type of ethos that once it is inculcated into society 
it will become a self-sustaining force for justice. This is further supported by Barnard-Naude 
and Louw who assert, quite convincingly, that good faith and Ubuntu projects a need for 
individuals in a community to infuse their relations with one another with respect, honesty 
and dignity. With such eloquent and well-reasoned academic opinion and such positive views 
on the possible future role of good faith being issued from the CC (more openly in Everfresh 
and less so in Barkhuizen) it is not hard to imagine that soon the good faith requirement will 
find a much more prominent place in our contract law. 
 
The more recent case of Botha and Another v Rich N.O. and Others279 concerned an 
instalment sale agreement, in terms of which Botha agreed to purchase immovable property 
from a trust. The agreement included a cancellation clause which entitled the trust to cancel 
the agreement and retain all payments received if Botha breached the contract. After paying 
75% of the purchase price, Botha defaulted on her payments. The trust then sued for 
cancellation and eviction, and was successful. 280  Botha demanded transfer of the property 
into her name in terms of section 27(1)281 of the Alienation of Land Act282.  The main issue 
before the CC was whether, in terms of section 27(1), Botha was entitled to have the property 
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registered in her name, against the registration of a mortgage bond in the trustees’ favour; in 
the alternative, would the enforcement of the cancellation clause be unreasonable, unfair and 
unconstitutional and, if so, would the trustees be obliged to pay back the money paid by 
Botha.283 
 
The court acknowledged its duty in terms of  s 39(2) of the Constitution, namely that when 
the courts interpret  a statute, such interpretation must be  done ‘through the prism of the Bill 
of Rights’ such that its spirit, purport and objects are promoted in its interpretation.284 The 
court distilled the purpose of section 27 as being to protect the interests of the purchaser of 
land.285  Section 27(1) provides that a purchaser who has undertaken to pay the purchase 
price in instalments, and who has paid more than 50% of the purchase price, will be entitled 
to demand transfer of the land on condition that the land is registerable, and that a mortgage 
bond is simultaneously registered in favour of the seller in order to secure payment of the 
balance of the purchase price. 
 
In response to Botha’s claim, the trust contended that in order for the demand in terms of 
section 27 to be valid the purchaser must rectify her breach. As Botha had not attempted to 
make her payment as it was due, there was no demand that gave a right to specific 
performance.286This is in accordance with the principle of reciprocity, which is based on the 
fact that a contract creates reciprocal obligations, therefore it follows that only if one party 
has performed or tendered to perform can that party claim for performance by the other party. 
This allows the other party to raise the defence of failure of counter-performance, also known 
as ‘the exception of a non-performed contract (exceptio non adimpleti contractus)’. The court 
held that this was a defence that could be raised by the trust as Botha’s right in terms of 
section 27 (1) was reciprocal to her obligations to pay instalments.287The court found that, 
due to the principle of reciprocity, Botha’s right in terms of section 27 only materialises once 
she has made good her arrears, by either paying it or registering a mortgage bond, as it would 
be unfair to secure her right to the property, even though she was in arears.288 
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The court then turned to the rigid application of the principle of reciprocity. The court stated 
that a rigid application may lead to injustice and that the law of contract, based on the 
principle of good faith, is flexible enough to ensure fairness is realised. The court reasoned 
that ‘concepts of justice, reasonableness and fairness historically constituted good faith in 
contract’, and further stated that in terms of such concepts, the principle of reciprocity was 
born, so it must be in line with the principle of good faith.289 The court acknowledged that the 
Act aims to ensure that the relationship between sellers and purchasers is a fair one, and this 
is in line with constitutional values and the recognition of the ‘dignity, freedom and equal 
worth of others’.290 A contract created with the purpose of benefitting both parties cannot 
fulfil its purpose while both parties are pursuing their own self- interests, by excluding 
consideration for the other party’s interests. In this regard the court stated that: 
 
Good faith is the lens through which we come to understand contracts in that way. In this case 
good faith is given expression through the principle of reciprocity and the exceptio non 
adimpleti contractus.291 
 
The court ultimately held that it would be unfair and disproportionate, given the 75% of the 
purchase price she had paid, to not allow Botha to exercise her right in terms of section 27, 
namely to have the property transferred to her name and, to register a mortgage bond in 
favour of the trust, in order to cure her breach. In this way the court’s decision to reject the 
defence of exceptio non adimpleti contractus , thereby allowing Botha to have the property 
transferred to her on the condition that she register a mortgage bond in favour of the trust and 
agree to pay all municipal balances, was ‘an equitable exercise of the discretion a court has to 
avoid undue hardship to the trustees.’. 292 
 
This judgement further illustrates the CC’s willingness to bolster the role of good faith and 
equality in contract law. The CC has clearly taken a substantive approach in recognising that 
it would be disproportionate and unfair to deprive Botha of her right in terms of s 27(1) 
considering the large amount of the purchase price she stood to lose should the cancellation 
clause, which she agreed to, had been enforced according to the black letter of the law. 
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When this CC judgement is considered it becomes apparent that if the trust had taken a good 
faith approach, that is by giving consideration to Botha’s interests and a level of respect, 
fairness and reasonableness, the obvious course of action would be to allow Botha her right in 
terms of section 27(1), which also would protect the trust’s interests as section 27(1) would 
have demanded a mortgage bond registered in the trust’s favour. What immediately becomes 
apparent is that in this case, a good faith approach by the trustees would have led to less 
conflict and a commercially satisfying result. 
 
It is all good and well that the CC is willing to revise the current role of good faith, but the 
threat of legal uncertainty is still looming in the background. Louw acknowledges that in 
addition to legal uncertainly, an unhealthy and careless approach to contracting may develop 
if people were allowed to use good faith to challenge the agreement they had struck293, and he 
suggests that an objective take on good faith is required294, which he defines as follows: 
 
[A]n ethical standard of fair dealing between parties which encompasses notions of trust, a 
moral basis for the enforcement of promises, reciprocity, a duty to act fairly, having regard for 
the legitimate interests of the other party, and to refrain from conduct that is commercially 
unacceptable to reasonable and honest people 
 
As Louw indicates, the need for a safer, more ‘user friendly’ form of good faith becomes 
quite apparent in the case of Standard Bank v Dlamini295, in which Dlamini had bought a car 
which broke down four days after he had bought it. Dlamini then immediately had the car 
towed back to the dealership296. Standard Bank asserted that they had a claim against Dlamini 
for vehicle he had voluntarily surrendered among other costs. However Pillay J identified that 
the issue here was whether Dlamini had comprehended the terms of the agreement he had 
signed. 
 
Pillay J deduced that Dlamini was ‘functionally illiterate’, ‘unsophisticated’, and that he had 
completed school at standard one. The learned judge explained that Dlamini had become ‘so 
excited about the purchase of a vehicle that he paid little attention to the repayment plan’ and 
perhaps the most pertinent observation is that: 
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He relied on the Bank to deduct reasonable instalments. He did not expect the Bank to deduct a 
high amount that left him without the means to support himself, his wife and his two little 
children. He expected to discover what the amount of those instalments would be when the 
Bank deducted its first instalment from his account. He trusted his bank. On discovering that he 
bought a defective vehicle he returned it intuitively to the person who sold it to him.297 
 
It becomes painfully obvious that the relationship of trust between Dlamini and Standard 
bank was one sided, much to the detriment of Dlamini. In a case like this the honest, 
respectful thing to do is to ensure that as the credit grantor, with its superior product 
knowledge, the customer is fully aware of the terms they are subjecting themselves to. Just as 
Dlamini had respected the bank enough to trust its decision on how much to take out of his 
account the same values of respect should have been extended to Dlamini. 
 
Louw illustrates how an objective standard based on good faith relations between parties to a 
contract can be a more direct route to justice. He explains that if an objective standard based 
on good faith relations between parties is applied to the facts of Dlamini then it would be 
abundantly clear that Dlamini ‘was in every sense reduced to an object of economic 




Louw also states that: 
It is […] inconceivable that our community would not be deemed to aspire to a fairer system of 
contract law in which mutual respect and mutual responsibility towards the other would be 
paramount.299 
 
It’s not hard to imagine that there are small towns dotted across South Africa in which people 
sleep with their doors unlocked, and leave their car keys in the car, a town where trust, justice 
and good faith is not just maintained but expected. South Africa at large, is a society that 
yearns for a culture of mutual respect and responsibility, and we are in desperate need of it. 
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Now that the courts are slowly coming around to giving good faith a defined, and as one 
should hope, an effective role in contract law, it is apparent that there is light at the end of the 
tunnel. 
 
And with this chance of good faith becoming a defined and properly functioning concept in 
contract law it is undeniable that good faith and Ubuntu will not tolerate the abuse of unequal 
bargaining power in contract law, nor will it tolerate a shallow and restrictive interpretation 
of equality, dignity and freedom. This demonstrates a movement towards a more substantive 
approach to equality, in other words a consideration of the realities faced by contracting 
parties. In South Africa it is no secret that a reality faced by many people is a lack of financial 
literacy and an abundance of poverty which means there is a vulnerable group in society that 
may be subjected to economic duress. The next chapter will discuss the possibility of a 
doctrine of economic duress being assimilated into South African law as such a doctrine will 



















5. THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC DURESS IN FULLY REALISING THE FACTOR OF 
UNEQUAL BARGAINING POWER  
5.1 Introduction 
In order for a binding contract to be created, certain requirements must be met. The parties to 
the contract must have the capacity to contract, the contract must be a legal one, performance 
according to the contract must be possible, and there must be certainty regarding the 
obligations of each party so the contract can be enforced.300 There is one more requirement 
which will be the focus of this chapter, namely that there must be consensus between parties 
for a contract to be binding. Consensus requires that there must be a meeting of the minds of 
the parties regarding the terms of the contract.301 In other words the parties to the contract 
must agree to the material terms of the contract. This is in accordance with the will theory, 
which is a subjective approach to determining the validity of a contract.  
However the situation does arise where it cannot be said that there was a meeting of the 
minds. This state of dissensus may be because of a misrepresentation, duress or undue 
influence. The next question to ask is whether one party had a reasonable belief, based on the 
words or conduct of the other party, that consensus had actually been reached.302 As the law 
of contract seeks to protect the reasonable belief of the induced party, such a contract is 
considered to be binding based on ‘quasi mutual assent’. The basis for a binding contract in 
such circumstances is the reliance theory, which is an objective approach to determining the 
validity of a contract.303 The protection offered to the induced, innocent party is that the 
contract is voidable should he wish to escape the contract provided that the requirements to 
void the contract are met.304It is submitted that through the doctrines of economic duress and 
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5.2 Economic duress in South African Law 
The doctrine of economic duress was recognised for the first time in South African law, in 
the case of Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Limited & Another v Bhamjee306. This case concerned 
two acknowledgements of debt signed by Bhamjee in favour of two medical aid schemes for 
money that he had claimed, and that the schemes had paid out to him. The relationship that 
existed between the parties was that Bhamjee was allowed to claim his fee straight from the 
medical aid schemes instead of from the patients.  
Bhamjee had paid back the first acknowledgement of debt in instalments over two years. The 
payment of a portion of the second acknowledgement of debt was to be set off, in 
instalments, against money claimed for by Bhamjee but which had not been paid out yet.307 
Not long after the second acknowledgment of debt was signed, Bhamjee was no longer 
permitted by the medical aid scheme to claim directly from them. Rather the patients would 
have to pay Bhamjee and would then be reimbursed by the medical aid schemes. This new 
arrangement did not sit well with Bhamjee’s patients as they preferred to consult a 
practitioner whose fee could be recovered directly from the schemes. As a result Bhamjee’s 
practice collapsed.308 Bhamjee then successfully sued Medscheme in the Pretoria High Court 
claiming that the acknowledgements of debt were signed under duress and were therefore 
void.309 
The ‘managed health care’ service was a service offered by Medscheme to the schemes under 
its administration which monitors and controls the costs incurred by the scheme.310 In 
managing the costs incurred, a comparison was made of a medical practitioner’s cost-profile 
against the average cost-profile of comparable practices. If there were concerning results, an 
investigation may ensue, followed by efforts to reduce or eliminate the discrepancies. 
Subsequently the practitioner may be referred to his respective professional body and the 
matter will be discussed with the practitioner. The scheme did have the discretion to refuse to 
accept claims from the practitioner directly. The obvious result was that patients will be 
discouraged from consulting with such a practitioner and they would seek out other 
practitioners in the scheme. The court acknowledged that such a discretion to either accept or 
refuse claims directly from the practitioner affords the medical aid scheme a superior 
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bargaining position in relation to those practitioners who depend upon their claims being paid 
by the scheme, especially when the practitioner’s economic survival depends on such an 
arrangement.311 
Through the process of the ‘managed health care’ service it was discovered that Bhamjee’s 
average cost-per-patient was substantially higher than the average cost-profile of comparable 
practices. In a meeting with a representative of the scheme, Bhamjee was informed that the 
scheme was considering no longer allowing him to make direct claims. Bhamjee then offered 
to pay a portion of the excess in an attempt to make the schemes reconsider. The 
representative promised to put this offer before the board of trustees. In making this offer 
Bhamjee signed the first acknowledgement of debt.312The court accepted that Bhamjee had 
signed the first acknowledgment of debt, believing that if he did not then his lucrative 
practice would be at risk.313 
The SCA stated that an ‘unlawful or unconscionable threat of some considerable harm’ which 
induced an undertaking renders that undertaking voidable. Further the SCA recognised that 
the harm facing Bhamjee, as he alleged, was economic harm which resulted from the 
relationship between him and the scheme.314 The question before the SCA was whether such 
a threat constituted duress in terms of the law. 315 
On the signing of the second acknowledgement of debt, another representative of the scheme 
had a meeting with Bhamjee regarding information that had come forward that Bhamjee was 
cheating the scheme. Bhamjee claimed that the gist of what the representative told him was 
that if he refused to sign the second acknowledgement of debt the scheme would refuse to 
allow him to claim directly from them. The court held that the scheme had adequate reasons 
to believe that it had been cheated by Bhamjee, therefore the resulting acknowledgement of 
debt was ‘no more than a settlement of the parties’ respective contentions, prompted by 
legitimate commercial considerations that fell far short of duress.’ 316 The SCA found that the 
acknowledgements of debt were not induced by an unconscionable threat that amounted to 
duress.317 
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The harm contemplated was specifically economic harm, and the court did acknowledge, 
with reference to Van den Berg & Kie Rekenkundige Beamptes v Boomprops318, that a 
doctrine of economic duress had not been accepted in South African law to date (in American 
and English law, a contract may be avoided on grounds of it being induced by economic 
pressure). The SCA went further to state that it saw no reason why the doctrine of economic 
duress should not be assimilated into South African law.319 
Although the SCA did not shed light on exactly how economic duress would operate in South 
African law, it did open the door to the possibility of such a doctrine finding a footing. The 
court did explain that cases of economic duress would be rare. The court’s reasoning is as 
follows:320 
 For it is not unlawful, in general, to cause economic harm, or even to cause economic ruin, to 
another, nor can it generally be unconscionable to do so in a competitive economy. In 
commercial bargaining the exercise of free will (if that can ever exist in any pure form of the 
term) is always fettered to some degree by the expectation of gain or the fear of loss. I agree 
with Van den Heever AJ (in Van den Berg & Kie Rekenkundige Beamptes at 795E-796A) that 
hard bargaining is not the equivalent of duress, and that is so even where the bargain is the 
product of an imbalance in bargaining power.  Something more – which is absent in this case – 
would need to exist for economic bargaining to be illegitimate or unconscionable and thus to 
constitute duress. 
This extract begs the question of when bargaining power (and its exercise) become legally 
relevant to a consideration of the validity of a contract. What can be concluded is that an 
agreement that is created by hard bargaining is acceptable in our law. A competitive economy 
thrives on such agreements. However the court has acknowledged that for economic 
bargaining to be considered illegitimate or unconscionable there is another factor that must be 
proven before the contract can be rendered void due to duress. In order to uncover this other 
factor, the concept of economic duress must be more closely examined. 
 
5.3 The Definition of Economic Duress 
Cassim likens economic duress to business compulsion, and defines it as ‘imposition, 
oppression or taking undue advantage of the business or financial stress or extreme necessity 
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or weakness of another’.321 Cassim goes further to explain that economic duress is 
‘constituted by illegitimate commercial pressure exerted on a party to a contract, which 
induces him to enter into the contract, and which amounts to a coercion of the will which 
vitiates his consent’.322 Hawthorne describes the establishment of the doctrine of economic 
duress as a manner of ensuring the voluntariness of contract.323 However there is no 
authoritative, judicial definition of economic duress in South African law as it is not, as yet, 
recognised in South African law. 
 
5.4 The Need for a Defined Concept of Economic Duress 
Modern commerce is characterised by an ethos which holds the profitability of a transaction 
to be of greater importance than the manner in which the transaction was completed, and in 
such circumstances it is more likely that contracts may be completed in an improper manner, 
such as being induced by an economic threat.324  
 
South Africa has experienced commercial growth which has resulted in more complex 
business relationships and some companies (and individuals) wield more wealth and power 
than others. However the law has not yet adapted to provide adequate relief for more complex 
commercial problems. It is now an undeniable reality in South Africa that an individual or a 
small business may be placed under an economic threat, which may be as illegitimate and 
unconscionable as a threat under recognised forms of duress. It is submitted that the doctrine 
of duress in its traditionally recognised form is no longer sufficient to provide relief to those 
who enter into a contract under duress, specifically economic duress.325  
Section 39 of the Constitution requires the courts to develop the common law in terms of the 
spirit, purport and objects of the bill of rights. At this point, considering the competing needs 
of the marketplace, namely commercial certainty and the needs of vulnerable contracting 
parties who require legal recognition of the realities of their weak bargaining position, it is 
clear that the courts are charged with finding a just balance. It is submitted that through a 
defined doctrine of economic duress, the improper use of a stronger bargaining position that 
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many are subjected to may be better realised and dealt with, along with developing a more 
substantive understanding of consensus.326  
 
As the court stated in Medscheme, a mere imbalance of power will not be sufficient to 
invalidate a contract, there is something more which is required for a contract to be rendered 
invalid.327 It becomes apparent that there is a need to determine when an imbalance of power 
leads to acceptable commercial pressure and when it leads to economic duress.328  
 
5.5 The Proposed Test for Economic Duress 
It is proposed that it is time for the South African law of contract to catch up with the rest of 
the world, by developing a doctrine of economic duress to deal with the often inevitable 
disputes arising in the context of modern commerce.329 
Glover proposes a modern test for duress to be assimilated into South African law that has 
been developed in Anglo- American and European law. This test is significant because not 
only does it apply to all types of coercion but it was specifically developed in an attempt to 
better understand economic duress.330 The test comprises of two parts, namely the proposal 
enquiry and the choice enquiry.  The proposal enquiry requires there to have been: (a) a threat 
(b) that was contra bonos mores, or illegitimate. Glover then states that the choice enquiry 
requires the threat to have: (a) in fact induced the contract, and (b) must have left the other 
party with no reasonable choice, or no acceptable alternative, but to succumb to the threat and 
enter into the contract.331  
 
5.6 Economic Duress Requires a Consideration of Bargaining Power 
The second element of the choice inquiry is of particular importance in respect of this study. 
In considering the threat that has left the party with ‘no reasonable choice, or no acceptable 
alternative, but to succumb to the threat and enter into the contract’, it is submitted that this, 
is a clear reference to the bargaining power of the parties.  
                                                          
326 Bhana & Pieterse (note 18 above) 887. 
327 Medscheme Holdings (note 306 above) 18. 
328 Bhana & Pieterse (note 18 above) 887. 
329 Glover (note 324 above) 286; Cassim (note 321 above) 529. 
330 Glover (note 324 above) 287-288 





Regarding the consequences of the threat, the doctrine of duress requires the party to consider 
all practical alternative options to submitting to the threat and signing the contract. The 
question that will be asked is would a reasonable person in the circumstances of the 
aggrieved party have behaved in such a manner. By considering the circumstances of the 
aggrieved party, it is obvious that the realities of the party’s bargaining position will be a 
factor in determining if the party was under duress, that is, if this test is in fact assimilated 
into South African law.332  
 
This becomes more apparent when one considers an illustration: a court may more easily find 
a case of duress if the aggrieved party was a consumer or a small business with few 
resources, than a multinational corporation with vast resources. A court is likely to find that it 
is acceptable for a consumer or small business, being threatened by a company in a more 
powerful position, to submit to the economic threat than resist it. While a larger company 
with ample resources is more likely able to put up some resistance.333 However the SCA’s 
conclusion regarding the first acknowledgement of debt in Medscheme is out of step with the 
foreign approach proposed by Glover. In this regard the court held that the first 
acknowledgment of debt was a trade-off because ‘[Dr. Bhamjee] considered it to be 
economically worthwhile, even though he would no doubt have preferred not to have been 
required to make it’ and therefore there was no duress.334  
 
The court here implies that Bhamjee chose to sign the first acknowledgement of debt because 
it was an economically viable choice therefore it was not because he had no other practical 
alternative (as duress would require there to have been no practical alternative). The court 
does not consider that he chose to do so as it was the lesser of two evils and therefor he was 
still subjected to duress. In other words, the doctrine of duress may accept that a choice to 
sign a contract may be an economically worthwhile option however the aggrieved party may 
still be acting under duress. This is so because the pressure may not cause a person to act 
involuntarily or remove all their choices, rather the pressure may deflect their will thus 
pressuring the aggrieved party to choose between the lesser of two evils.335  
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If the reasonable person test, as required by the choice enquiry, had to be applied here, and 
the options available to Bhamjee were considered, it is likely that a reasonable person in his 
position would have succumbed to the threat and signed the contract which was a lesser evil 
than having the scheme refuse to accept his direct claims, which would result in his business 
collapsing as it eventually did. This indicates that Bhamjee was in fact acting under duress. 
Bhamjee was backed into a corner, with no reasonable alternative, yet the court found that he 
had made a free choice or a choice without duress, because it was economically worthwhile. 
This line of reasoning does not consider the economic realities faced by Bhamjee and 
therefore does not fully realise the effect of the relative bargaining position of the aggrieved 
party.336 The doctrine economic duress must be developed, in line with European and Anglo-
American law, to include a consideration of the economic realities faced by aggrieved 
parties.337  
 
5.7 The Difference between Hard Bargaining and Economic Duress 
It is of vital importance to note that by simply proving that there was an imbalance of 
bargaining power would not be sufficient to show that succumbing to the threat was 
reasonable. A consideration of the bargaining power would do little to give effect to 
substantive equality without also considering the realities of the party who makes the threat, 
namely that it is within their rights to drive a hard bargain. For this reason a clear distinction 
between hard bargaining and economic duress is imperative if the development of a doctrine 
of economic duress as well as an effective doctrine of Inequality of bargaining power are to 
be successfully integrated into South African law.338 It is submitted that the distinction 
between hard bargaining and economic duress becomes apparent when the conduct of the 
threatening party violates a constitutional value. 
A situation of duress occurs when a stronger party takes advantage of a weaker party in an 
unconscionable manner.339 The right to equality is immediately implicated when terms are 
not negotiated on equal ground and are often burdensome and unwanted by the weaker party. 
The contract then becomes terms dictated by the strong party which is forced on the weaker 
party.  
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It is illogical and impossible to require that each person be on absolute equal standing for a 
contract to be valid.340 Each person has a different skill set, a different background, and often 
unequal access to resources. Some differences must be accepted. A court will accept certain 
imbalances in bargaining power as being present, but should only see fit to intervene when 
one party has taken an unfair advantage of the other and acted contrary to good faith.341   
 
Therefore, to answer the question of when hard bargaining becomes illegitimate economic 
pressure one could argue this would be the case when the hard bargaining has the effect of 
inhibiting the constitutional value of equality. In determining when the value of equality has 
been restricted requires an in-depth analysis of the consequences of the conduct of the 
threatening party.342 This in-depth analysis requires an examination of the specific context, or 
bargaining position, of each party because what is acceptable in one context may not be in 
another context.343This highlights the vital importance of the role of the bargaining positions 
of each party to properly determine if hard bargaining has crossed the line and become 
economic duress. In other words it is only with a consideration of the bargaining positions of 
the parties, that it is possible to determine if the constitutional value of equality has been 
restricted. 
 
Additionally, in the case of Gerolomou Constructions (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk344, Tuchten J 
explained that it is not permissible for an economically powerful party to withhold what is 
owed to an economically weaker party in order to secure some commercial advantage.345 He 
went on to explain, with reference to Barhkiuzen, that the sanctity of contract is ‘intimately 
connected’ with the constitutional values of freedom and dignity. It was on this basis that the 
judge stated that the use of a threat to breach an existing contract is conduct that is contrary to 
the values of freedom and dignity.  
 
It is important to note that the court found this case to be an instance of undue influence and 
not economic duress, however the facts of the case fall more appropriately within the doctrine 
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of economic duress.346 This case shows that when the conduct of the threatening party, in the 
context of the particular bargaining positions of each party, restricts constitutional values it 
constitutes improper pressure and renders the contract voidable.347 In other words the values 
of freedom, dignity and equality may determine when hard bargaining crosses the line and 
becomes economic duress. 
 
Further support for this submission is found in the proposal enquiry which requires that the 
threat be contrary to the boni mores, or legal convictions of the community. Public policy 
represents the legal convictions of the community, which are values that are viewed by 
society to be of paramount importance.348  Public policy is now informed by the values 
founded in the Constitution, namely the realization of human dignity, equality, freedom, the 
rule of law and human rights.349 This means that a contract which is contrary to the values of 
freedom, equality and dignity will be contrary to public policy and therefore 
unenforceable.350   
When considering public policy, equity and dignity it is no longer possible to ignore the 
constitutional value of Ubuntu and its possible impact on contract law. The CC has explained 
that contract law can no longer be considered without consideration of the value of Ubuntu, 
which informs the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution and which represents the 
values of the majority of the people.351 The CC has expressed its desire to infuse the common 
law with constitutional values, including Ubuntu, which demands people to transact with a 
standard of reasonableness, mutual respect, fairness and good faith.352 This is further 
evidenced by the fact that the CC no longer tolerates a rigid application of the principle of 
reciprocity.353 A person cannot be forced to adhere to a contract they have signed if such 
enforcement would lead to injustice.354 This is because contract law is based on good faith 
which demands a contract to be reasonable and fair.355 The principle of reciprocity inherently 
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demands a contracting part to have respect for the other party’s dignity and freedom first, 
before he attempts to enforce the contract.356 
It follows that embedded in the proposed test for economic duress, developed in English and 
Anglo American law, is the requirement that the threat must be contrary to constitutional 




Although the parameters of the exercise of economic duress is not set out in the case of 
Medscheme, the SCA in this case has set the scene for the equity doctrine of economic duress 
to be assimilated into South African contract law. It is decided that a contract created due to 
mere hard bargaining is accepted to be valid, which means there must be something more that 
exists which renders the contract to be unconscionable and therefore voidable. For this 
reason, there is a need to determine when an imbalance of power leads to acceptable 
commercial pressure and when it leads to economic duress.357  
Glover’s proposed test for economic duress encompasses an enquiry to determine when 
economic duress exists, instead of acceptable commercial pressure (an enquiry which the law 
of contract cannot properly address as yet). The second element of the choice inquiry requires 
the bargaining power of the parties (in other words the economic realities faced by the 
parties) to be considered in order to determine whether the induced party had any reasonable 
alternatives but to succumb to signing the contract. The distinction between hard bargaining 
and economic duress becomes apparent when the conduct of the threatening party violates the 
constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom as well as concepts of public policy, 
good faith and Ubuntu. It is clear that if this proposed test is assimilated into South African 
law, bargaining power and substantive equality, through the required consideration of the 
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Contracts form an integral part of our everyday life. Given the competitive, capitalistic 
environment in which we transact, it is usually inevitable that contracts entered into, do not 
epitomise equality as one party is usually in a superior bargaining position. This imbalance of 
bargaining power cannot be avoided, however judicial intervention is required when there is 
an abuse of a party in a weaker bargaining position. From the examination of Brisley and 
Afrox the SCA favoured a classical liberal understanding of freedom and dignity which seems 
to trump any proper consideration of substantive equality between parties. Even though the 
SCA in Afrox acknowledged that the bargaining power of the parties is relevant in 
determining whether a contract offended public policy, the nature of the lessor- lease or 
doctor- patient relationship between the parties is criticised to have not been fully considered 
as the constitutional requirement of substantive equality demands. These cases illustrate the 
underdeveloped enforcement of substantive equality in contract law. However, in line with its 
transformative duty, the courts went further in the case of Barkhuizen by creating a test for 
public policy which requires an examination of the realities faced by the contracting parties. 
Slowly but surely with the development of a substantive equality requirement in contract law, 
and the bargaining power, or realities faced by parties may become more fully realised.  
However there is still some uncertainty regarding the manner of enforcing equity in contract 
law, as evidenced in the cases of Jordan and Uniting Reform Church which are significantly 
out of step with the cautious approach adopted by the SCA. These cases illustrate a need for 
the realisation of substantive equality in contract law as well as a well-defined method in 
which the courts deal with equity considerations like bargaining power in the future. In line 
with their constitutional duty to develop the common law with constitutional values, the 
courts must develop the law of contract to break free of restrictive classical liberal definitions 
of freedom and dignity and to realise substantive equality in contract law. This would 
demand a context sensitive approach to each matter.   
The doctrine of good faith demands a standard of honesty and respect between contracting 
parties. It follows that an abuse of superior bargaining power would fall afoul of such a 
standard of honesty and mutual respect. Most recently in the cases of Everfresh and Botha the 
CC has expressed its desire to infuse the law with equity principles of good faith and Ubuntu 





contract terms. These cases illustrate the CC willingness to consider the realities faced by 
contracting parties, which is in line with a substantive equality approach to contract law. 
It is further submitted that through a realisation of economic duress the bargaining power of 
parties can be more fully realised. An often over looked flaw in the reasoning that an agreed 
upon contract must be upheld, is that in some cases there is no actual meeting of the minds 
due to some duress experienced by the one party such that they feel forced to submit and sign 
the contract in question. The doctrine of Economic duress has not yet been assimilated into 
South African Law. However the SCA’s optimism regarding a possible South African 
doctrine of economic duress, coupled with Glovers proposed test for economic duress 
illustrates that the law is ripe for such a development towards substantive equity. The test 
proposed by Glover, specifically the second leg of the test, requires an examination of the 
realities faced by the party due to the influence of the threat. This context sensitive approach 
seeks to give life to substantive equity in contract law. 
The SCA and CC have slowly begun to pay more attention to constitutional values of dignity, 
freedom and equality, and considering the development of the role of good faith and the 
possible doctrine of economic duress it seems that contract law is well on its way to 
embodying substantive equality, with a healthy understanding of the effect of unequal 
bargaining power. The courts are charged with a transformative duty by the constitution to 
ensure such promising development continues: 
What the Constitution demands of them  [judicial officers] is that a legal order be established 
that gives substance to its founding values — democracy, dignity, equality and freedom; a legal 
order consistent with the constitutional goal of improving the quality of life of all citizens, and 
freeing the potential of each person. The challenge facing us as a nation is to create such a 
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